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MIRANDA V. ARIZONA- THE LA\V TODAY::• 
Captain Frederic I. Lederer :::::: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
You have the right to remain silent; anything you say 
may be used against you at t1-ial; you hm'e a 1·ight to con· 
sult with a lawyer and t.o have a lawyer present during 
this interrogation and if you cannot a.[{01·d a lawye1· one 
will be appointed j01· you. 
Thus speaks the Supreme Court in Miranda l'. Arizona, 1 surely 
one of the Court's most controversial decisions in criminal law, and 
one almost certain to be modified by the Court in the near future. 
The decision is complex and will be discussed at length later. How-
ever, it is important to note at this point that the decision in 
Miranda supplied an affirmative duty on the part of police desiring 
to conduct custodial interrogations to warn an accused of his right to 
remain silent and of a right to counsel at interrogations far broader 
than had ever existed before the decision. Contrary to some impres-
sions, the basic nature of Mimnda was far from unpredictable-
what was unusual was the specificity found within the opinion and 
the strictness with which it had to be applied to be of value. 
The history of the Supreme Court's dealings with the confession 
problem is a story of partially futile attempts to find a tool with 
which to control improper police conduct. In the development of the 
contemporary law of confessions, the tool the Court ultimately 
seized was the right to counsel. This right was considered, if not the 
perfect tool, at least far better than its nearest competitors. The 
first decision of nationwide scope was Massiah v. United States, 2 
finding a sixth amendment right to counsel at post-indictment inter-
*The opinions and conclusions presented in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School or 
any other governmental agency. 
** JAGC, U.S. Army. Instructor, Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate 
General's School, on extended leave to study European criminal law on a 
Fulbright-Hays Fellowship at the Max Planck Institut fur auslandisches und in-
ternationales Strafrecht, at Freiburg, Germany. B.S., 1968, Polytechnic Institute 
of New York; J.D., 1971, Columbia University; LL.M., 1976, and S.J.D. candi-
date, University of Virginia. Member ofthe Bars of New York, the United States 
Court of :Military Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. 
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The warnings listed represent only one variation of those in 
general use, and do not include the required waiver questions. 
2 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Court had previously been disturbed by police interfer-
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rogations when the defendant had retained counsel. Massialt was 
followed in a few months by Escobedo v. Illinois. 3 
Within the military service, a requirement for counsel warnings 
has been in effect since at least the 1967 decision of the Court of 
Military Appeals in the case of United States v. Tempia. 4 
II. ESCOBEDO V. ILLINOIS 
On January 19, 1960, Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law was fa-
tally shot. Escobedo was arrested, interrogated and released the 
next day. On January 30th an accomplice turned state's evidence, 
and r,scr bedo was arrested and taken to the police station. During 
the ride to the station house Escobedo refused to answer questions, 
stating that he wanted advice from his lawyer. 5 
Notified by the mother of a friend, Escobedo's lawyer arrived at 
the station house soon after Escobedo. Despite his best efforts, in 
which he spoke to virtually every policeman in the area including 
the chief of police, the lawyer was refused permission to speak with 
his client until questioning was completed. Escobedo repeatedly re-
quested permission to see his counsel. Confronted with an accusa-
tion that his accomplice had blamed the crime on him, Escobedo 
admitted participation in the crime. At trial Escobedo's motions to 
suppress the statements were overruled. The Supreme Court re-
versed on right-to-counsel grounds. Through Mr. Justice Goldberg, 
ence with a suspect':> desire to contact counsel. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 
U.S. 503 (1963) (police refused to allow accused to call wife or attorney). 
3 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
4 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.l\LR. 249 (1967). See Lederer, Rights Warnings in the 
Armed Services, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1976). While there is some small confusion 
relating to the right to counsel at interrogations prior to Miranda v. Arizona, it 
appears that the Court of Military Appeals, apparently applying the sixth amend-
ment, had held that a suspect who requested counsel had a right to consult with a 
lawyer. See United States v. Wimberley, 16 C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966); 
United States v. Rose, 8 C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957); United States v. 
Gunnels, 8 C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957). The right to consult with counsel 
meant only that the suspect had the right to speak with privately retained counsel 
or the staff judge advocate or his representative. It did not include the right to 
have counsel present at the interrogation and did not include the right to have 
counsel appointed for any but the most limited purpose. See Wimberley, 16 
C.l\l.A. at 10, 36 C.M.R. at 166. But see Gunnels, 8 C.M.A. at 139, 23 C.l\I.R. at 
359. Clearly no right existed for a suspect to be warned of his limited right to 
consult with counsel. Wimberley, 16 C.M.A. at 10, 36 C.M.R. at 166. Miranda 
was adopted by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Tempia, 16 
C. M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). While it seems far from clear, it would appear 
that the pre-Tempia decisions of the Court of Military Appeals were implicitly 
overruled by Tempia, requiring one to presume that the primary right to counsel 
at interrogations is found only in the fifth and sixth amendments as interpreted by 
Miranda. 
5 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479. 
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the Court reasoned that when Escobedo was refused the right to 
see his lawyer he had become an accused and the pw·pose of the 
interrogation was to "get him." 6 According to Mr. Justice 
Goldberg, "it would exalt form over substance to make right to 
counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time 
of interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment. 
Petitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with 
murder." 7 Thus, the Court's prior decision in Massiah was ex-
tended to the Escobedo fact pattern. 
The decision was otherwise buttressed by stating that for the 
right to counsel at trial to have any meaning counsel would be 
necessary at pretrial interrogation, for otherwise the conviction 
would already have been assured. 8 Interrogation was thus a "criti-
cal stage." The holding of the case was stated thusly: 
Where . . . the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an 
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the 
suspect has been taken into police custody. the police carry out a 
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating 
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportu-
nity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively 
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. the 
accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment .... 9 
Surely a more limited decision could scarcely have been imagined. 
Yet Mr. Justice White, 10 dissenting, viewed the decision more ex-
pansively, stating that "[a]t the very least the Court holds that once 
the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any 
admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence 
unless the accused has waived his right to counsel." 11 As time 
proved, Justice White's prediction was remarkably accw·ate. Taken 
at his word, however, Justice Goldberg's decision was limited to 
cases in which a defendant was made aware of his right to remain 
silent and requested and was refused access to his counsel. A warn-
ing of the right to counsel was not required. Further, for Escobedo 
to apply, the investigation had to have "focused" on the accused who 
had also to have been taken into custody. The definition of focus was 
left open. 
6 I d. at 485. 
7 I d. at 486. 
8 I d. at 487, citing In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) <Black, J. in an opinion 
joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas and Brennan JJ., dissenting). 
9 I d. at 490-91. 
10 I d. at 495. 
11 Id. 
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Ultimately, Escobedo, a limited decision when taken at its word, 
proved of limited value. 12 Far more important was the use of the 
decision as a stepping stone to what Justice White feared was likely, 
the case of Miranda v. Arizona. 
III. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 13 
The Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois 14 left the 
law of confessions in uncertainty. While the decision itself had been 
narrow and virtually limited to the facts of the case, potential for 
broad expansion was clearly evident. Deeply concerned by the need 
to predict the Supreme Court's ultimate interpretation of the fifth 
amendment, the organized bar struggled to delimit the final bound-
aries of the Escobedo decision. 15 Foremost among the questions left 
by Escobedo were: 
When did a suspect who desired to see retained counsel 
have a right to see him? 
Did a suspect who desired counsel during or before inter-
rogation but who lacked the funds to retain one have a 
right to have one appointed free of charge? 
Did government interrogators have to affirmatively warn 
suspects of their right to counsel prior to interrogation? 
The questions left by Escobedo were almost solely ones relating 
to a right to counsel. At stake was the suspect's right to consult 
12 Taken literally, the opinion was of little consequence. However, the case 
rapidly came to be viewed as prescribing a right to counsel whenever an investiga· 
tion had "focused" on a suspect subjected to police interrogation. The definition of 
"focus" defied easy resolution until it was subsumed into Miranda's definition of 
"custody." Escobedo was, in one respect, a critical decision for it clearly extended 
the right to counsel to the investigatory process. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, 
found this particularly objectionable: "[T]he vital fact remains that this case docs 
not involve the deliberate interrogation of a defendant after the initiation of judi-
cial proceedings against him," 378 U.S. at 492; and 
the Court today converts a routine police investigation ... into a distorted analogue of a judi· 
cial trial. It imports into this investigation constitutional concepts historically applicable only 
after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so, I think the Court perverts 
those precious constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital Interests of society In pro· 
serving the legitimate and proper function of honest and purposeful police Investigation. 
378 U.S. at 494. 
13 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
14 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
15 See, Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 440 at n.2 (1966). Ultimately, the Court held Es-
cobedo to its facts. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974), citing Kirby v. 
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966). 
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with a lawyer prior to or during a custodial interrogation. The right 
to counsel became the focal point of the problem because of the 
Court's belief that the police-dominated atmosphere surrounding 
most interrogations could be offset only by the presence of a lawyer 
whose sole responsibility was to the suspect. Ultimately of course 
the post-Escobedo issues reached the Supreme Court. 
The vehicle which the Court chose to resolve the Escobedo prob-
lems was Miranda, consolidated with three other cases, 16 all of 
which raised related fifth amendment and confession problems. 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the individual 
cases, it is important to point out that as a group they included most 
of the factual variations important to an attempted definitive res-
olution of the Escobedo issues. Both state and federal cases were 
included; warnings of one type or another had been given in some 
cases but not in others. 17 Similarly, while the relief requested in 
each case was identical, the reversal of a conviction, or the affir-
mance of a reversal, the legal arguments raised by the various de-
fendants varied from a limited reliance on the due process voluntar-
iness doctline to a claim that the Constitution required automatic 
assignment of counsel before a custodial interrogation could yield 
admissible evidence. In almost all the cases the defendants placed 
their primary reliance on the fifth amendment right against self-
inclimination, arguing that the right to counsel was essential to a 
realistic exercise of the privilege. 
16 Vignera v. New York; Westover v. United States; and California v. Stewart, 
consolidated with .Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
17 Miranda, Vignera, and Steu·art were state cases, while U'estot·er \\'a8 a federal 
case. In Miranda, the accused was suspected of rape and kidnapping. After a 
lineup in which Miranda was identified, he was interrogated without prior warn· 
ings for about thirty minutes after which he confessed. Prior to trial, a court· 
ordered psychiatric examination found Miranda to be an immature 23-year-old 
with an 8th grade education, with a prior record and a sociopathic personality 
disorder or disturbance since an early age. The written confession ultimately 
signed by .Miranda contained a paragraph stating that it was given voluntarily and 
with knowledge that it could be used against him. At trial the defense counsel 
objected to its admission on the grounds that the defendant had had a right to 
counsel at the time of his arrest. 
Vignera was arrested for armed robbery of a dress shop. He confessed to police 
after arrest and after a successful lineup. Subsequently, Vignera made a full con-
fession again to an assistant district attorney. This confession, recorded by a 
stenographer, was admitted against Vignera at trial over defense objection. 
In Stewart, the defendant was charged with robbery and murder. Stewart \\'a8 
questioned after a successful search of his house. He made a number of admi8sions 
during three days of questioning. On the fifth day of questioning he admitted the 
robbery of the murder victim, although not the murder or the other robberies he 
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Perhaps the best and most comprehensive argument was made by 
the America! Civil Liberties Union appearing as amicus curiae: 18 
The protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege afforded by the 
presence of counsel in police custodial interrogation designed to elicit 
a confession has been spelled out in other briefs in this case, is well 
known to this Court, and therefore, can be here quickly summarized. 
These include giving an effective warning of the suspect's privilege 
"to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise 
of his will"; providing someone in whom the subject can confide and 
who is a contact between the subject and the outside world; assuring 
that if the subject chooses to tell his story, he does so in a way that 
conveys his intended meaning; and providing an outside observer to 
the interrogation proceedings. 
Obviously an effective warning of the privilege is a keystone of its 
effective enforcement. It is equally clear that there is a need to pro-
vide the presence of someone at interrogation in whom the subject 
can confide and who will bolster his confidence. As discussed above, it 
is a prime function of police custodial incommunicado interrogation to 
tear a subject away from all things on which he can rely for support 
and place him in complete subservience to the interrogator. The aim 
is to have him dominated by the interrogator. In order to dispel such 
circumstances, therefore, it is manifestly necessary that the incom-
municado environment be eliminated. The presence of counsel will 
tend to accomplish this aim. Not only is counsel a person outside the 
police force, he is one who can meet the accomplished police inter-
rogator on a level of at least partial equality. By training and experi-
ence he should not be afraid to stand up to unrestrained governmental 
power. He is someone in whom the subject can freely confide. It is his 
was charged with. The statements were apparently made without warnings and 
without a request for counsel. They were received into evidence against Stewart. 
After the California Supreme Court reversed the conviction for failure to supply 
counsel, utilizing the expansive reading of Escobedo, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), the State of California appealed. The 
defense reply appears to have argued reliance on due process voluntariness as 
well as right to counsel. 
Westover was arrested by Kansas City police on suspicion of robbery and was 
then held for the FBI because of possible involvement in two California robberies. 
The FBI interrogated Westover in the Kansas City jail after the local police had 
completed their own questioning. Westover was first advised by the FBI that he 
had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in a 
court of law, and that he had the right to consult with an attorney. Westover then 
confessed. He made similar statements with corrections the day after and was 
finally arraigned on federal charges eleven days after the initial state arrest. At 
the Supreme Court the defense claimed that Westover should have been actually 
supplied with counsel. Further, the delay in arraignment was attacked. See J. 
MEDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATO!IIY OF A SUPREME COURT 
DECISION 31-42 (1966). 
18 Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, at 21-23, reprinted 
in Medalie at 66-67. 
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job to be a whole-hearted advoeate for the subject with no conflicting 
interests in this regard. 
In order to make effective the privilege against self-incrimination it is 
also necessary to ensure that if a person desires to tell his story h~ is 
allowed to do so in a way that conveys his intended meaning. A police 
interrogator, however, is basically an accomplished cross-examiner 
who is trained to allude to a particular piece of incriminating evidence 
but then to "be on guard to shut off immediately any explanation the 
subject may start to offer at that time." Counsel present will tend to 
ensure that the accused has a real opportunity, if he so desires, to tell 
his story effectively and to eliminate distortions and ambiguities. In 
short, counsel can aid in examining the accused so that his :;tory 
comes out as he aims to tell it as well as protecting him from unre-
strained cross-examination .... 19 
Appeals to the sixth amendment right to counsel, though present, 
were rare. Just as the claims made by the convicted defendants 
were quite varied in scope, so too did the positions taken by the 
counsel for the state and federal prosecution vary widely, ranging 
from an outright denial of any right to counsel or warnings to the 
comparatively mild position taken by then Solicitor General Mar-
shall 20 in which he conceded the right to counsel at interrogations 
but denied the need to warn suspects of the existence of that 
right. 21 Government counsel were united in their concern for the 
possible consequences to law enforcement that might flow from an 
absolute right to counsel at interrogations. 22 
ts I d. 
20 Now Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall of the Supreme Court. 
21 See, J. MEDALIE, supra note 17, at 133-34, 140. Marshall belie\•ed that a de-
fendant had a right to see his own counsel but that the Government was not re-
quired to appoint a lawyer for an accused without counsel. While he supported the 
concept of warnings as a matter of policy or procedure, he denied that the Con-
stitution required such warnings. 
Note that official transcripts of Supreme Court arguments are not available. 
However, in view of the importance of Miranda and its associated case,;, a private 
transcript was made by the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure of the 
Georgetown University Law Center, portions of which are reprinted in J. 
MEDALIE, supra note 17, at 77-188, and in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, 
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 531-39 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
KAMISAR]. 
22 Counsel asserted that the consequences of such a right would be se\'ere. On the 
one hand it was assumed that it would be impossible to supply the number of 
lawyers needed, and on the other that defense counsel would automatically tell 
their clients to remain silent. Any way that the prosecution viewed the situation, 
the usefulness of interrogation would be nil. It is interesting to compare these dire 
predictions with the actual results of llfirmrda; it appears that most suspects 
routinely waive their rights to counsel and to remain silent. 
113 
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The Supreme Court's decision became of course even more con-
troversial than its earlier decision in Escobedo. The Court 
announced a prospective rule 23 that required police desiring to con-
duct a custodial interrogation to warn a suspect of his right to re-
main silent and his right to have and consult with a lawyer at the 
interrogation. In the oft quoted critical passage of the majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated: 
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages 
which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from cus-
todial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless 
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of 
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exer-
cise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, 
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and 
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, 
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the proc-
ess that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there 
can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and incH-
cates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the 
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have an-
swered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own 
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any fur-
ther inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter 
consents to be questioned. 24 
Although a definitive analysis of the Miranda decision is beyond 
the scope of this work, it can be suggested that the Court's decision 
flows smoothly from its earlier voluntariness decisions. One can 
only presume that incommunicado custodial police interrogation 
23 The Court subsequently announced that Miranda applied only to cases the trial 
of which began after June 13, 1966, the date of the decision in Miranda. Johnson 
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 
(1974), allowing use of derivative evidence obtained in a pre-Miranda interroga-
tion. The Court has also held Miranda inapplicable to statements obtained before 
Miranda but used in retrial taking place after Miranda. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 
U.S. 213 (1969). Note that state rules may differ and be more beneficial to an 
accused. See Commonwealth v. Romberger, 454 Pa. 279, 312 A.2d 353 (1975). 
24 384 U.S. at 444-45 (footnotes omitted). 
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tends to be inherently coercive 25 and accordingly must be compen-
sated for through the giving of an explanation of a suspect's rights 
and through the extension of a right to a lawyer at the interroga-
tion. The Court drew such a conclusion relying upon the fact, as it 
viewed it, that modern custodial interrogation is psychologically 
rather than physically oriented. The right to counsel then was the 
"protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the inter-
rogation." 26 The Court also noted that without protections dw·ing 
pretrial interrogation, all the safeguards supplied at trial would be-
come empty formalities. 27 
The holding of the Miranda decision can thus be viewed as an 
extension of the voluntariness doctrine. The critical parts of the de-
cision extend the right to counsel to custodial interrogations, 28 re-
quire that the suspect in such a setting be informed of his rights, 
and require an affirmative waiver before questioning can take place. 
Having once recognized not only the right of a suspect to consult 
with a lawyer at an interrogation, but the desirability of such repre-
sentation, the Court was faced with problems of equal protection. 
Those who were wealthy enough to have counsel would receive not 
only full information as to their right to remain silent but also tacti-
cal advice and assistance and the psychological support the Court 
deemed vital to overcome the coercive station house atmosphere. 
Those too poor to have counsel would automatically be placed in a 
far more vulnerable and dangerous position. 
Faced with a dichotomy in result based solely on economic fac-
tors, the Court chose not to regard the presence of counsel on behalf 
of those who could afford them as a lucky gratuitous assist but 
rather a basic dilemma which could be resolved only by granting the 
right to counsel to all regardless of indigency. Thus the core of the 
25 The Supreme Court has consistently held that police custody and questioning 
are not "inherently coercive" so as to render a statement involuntary. See Bram 
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 556-58 (1897). However, Mira11da lea\'es the 
reader with the unmistakable impression that the Court finally held otherwise. 
Certainly it is not the type of "inherent coercion" that makes all statements in· 
voluntary, for spontaneous statements are admissible without warnings of coun-
sel, and the .Miranda rights can be waived despite custodial circumstances. Ac· 
cordingly, the term "inherently coercive" is used here in an attempt to describe 
accurately the Court's reasoning despite clear restrictions on the ultimate utility 
of the expression. 
2s 384 U.S. at 465. 
27 I d. at 466, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1964). 
28 If, after being warned, the suspect requests counsel and counsel is unavailable, 
the police may not question him. The police always have the option of making 
counsel available or not interrogating. 
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Miranda decision is its affirmative extension of the right to counsel 
to all suspects subjected to custodial interrogation. The rights warn-
ings required by the opinion not only directly implement the right 
against self-incrimination by informing suspects of its existence, but 
also support the right via the warning that the suspect may have 
counsel present to assist him regardless of possible poverty. 
Perhaps as important as the Court's holding, however, is the ad-
ditional language which accompanies it. The Court did not announce 
hard and fast rules; it expressly recognized the possibility of 
superior safeguards being created for custodial questioning of sus-
pects:29 Having done so, it simply stated that until such safeguards 
were developed by a jurisdiction, the right to counsel, accompanied 
by its warnings, was to be given before resulting evidence could be 
admissible at trial. 30 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO MIRANDA 
Criticism of Miranda has taken many forms, not the least of 
which has been a broadside attack on the decision's entire holding. 
Perhaps best expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent,31 such a 
view finds the expansion of the right to counsel to interrogations to 
be both unfounded in precedent and necessity. 
Justice Harlan took issue with the majority's attempt to eliminate 
all possibilities of coercion in its attempt to create what he viewed 
as a utopian conception of voluntariness. 32 Justice Harlan viewed 
some form of pressure as inherent in interrogation and felt that un-
acceptable forms of pressure could easily be dealt with via the 
Court's earlier voluntariness precedents. Showing a keen degree of 
insight, he also questioned the validity of the waiver allowed by 
Miranda, asking how such a waiver could be voluntary when the 
right to counsel itself had been extended to cope with what was 
viewed as inherent coercion. Similarly, he asked how spontaneous 
statements uttered in a custodial setting could be considered volun-
tary when the answer to the simplest question, unaccompanied by 
the required waiver, would be inadmissible. 
29 384 U.S. at 467. Note that the Court later classified the warning requirements 
of Miranda as only "prophylactic rules developed to protect" the right against 
self-incrimination. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). 
30 It now seems apparent that the Court is preparing to modify the Miranda 
warning requirement. 
31 384 U.S. 436, 504 (Harlan, J. dissenting, joined by Stewart and White, JJ .). 
32 /d. at 505. Mr. Justice Harlan also questioned the application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in the police station house, claiming that historically the 
privilege had been inapplicable to "extra-legal confessions." !d. at 510. 
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Justice Harlan, like many others, also assumed that a lawyer 
present during an interrogation would normally advise his client to 
remain silent. Accordingly, he felt that the Miranda opinion would 
substantially interfere with necessary police investigation \\ithout 
adequate justification. While the recognition of a right to counsel at 
inten-ogations was the heart of Mimnda, its requirement that a 
suspect be warned of his rights to counsel and to remain silent were 
also questioned. 
The majority opinion referred to the experience of a number of 
agencies 33 and foreign jurisdictions 34 which utilized rights warn-
ings. While the FBI, military, and English experiences all appeared 
relevant, only one 35 of the jurisdictions utilized a right to counsel at 
inten-ogations 36 and accordingly the experience of those jw·isdic-
tions had at best limited validity for general American application. 
The English 37 Judges' Rules, cited by the Court, did require that 
33 The Court cited with approval the warnings required by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation pursuant to departmental instruction, and the warning~> required to 
be given in the military prior to criminal investigation, UNIFORM CODE OF lliL· 
ITARY JUSTICE art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1970) (hereinafter cited as UCMJ). 
384 U.S. at 483-86, 489. 
34 The Court referred to safeguards found at the time in England, Scotland, India, 
and Ceylon. 384 U.S. 436, 486-89. See note 37 infra. 
35 While the FBI gave a right to counsel warning, it did not include the right to 
obtain counsel for indigents until counsel was granted by a judge and it did not 
include the affirmative waiver apparently required by .\fira11da. 384 U.S. 436, 
521. 
36 While the right to counsel, apparently based on sixth amendment consid-
erations, had been evolving in the military, see United States\', Wimberley, 16 
C.:M:.A. 3. 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966), the cases cited by the Supreme Court, 384 U.S. 
at 489 n.63, only recognized that a suspect who requested a lawyer had to be 
allowed to consult with an attorney. Thus, military experience supplied minimal 
support for the Court's holding as to counsel warnings. The statutory military 
rights warnings did not include a right to counsel. See gellt'rally, Lederer, Rights 
Warnings in the Anned Services, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 0976). However, the statut-
ory warnings had not caused any great difficulty in military police investigations. 
37 As presently promulgated, the JUDGES' RULES state: 
JUDGES' RULES 
These Rules do not affect the principles 
(a) That citizens have a duty to help a police officer to dlsro\·~r ar.d app~l:or.d orf~r.rlorn, 
(b) That police officers, otherwise than by arrest, canr.ot compel any perum asalr.>t bl• 
will to come to or remain in any police sW.tion: 
(c) That every person at any stage or an in\'estigation •hould bto nblo to rommunl<nto acd 
to consult privately with a solid tor. This is so ~\·en if he b in cuotody pro,·idc:od that In 
such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is cau•<d to tho prO« OS<'> of in\'ooUga· 
tion or the administration or justice by his doing so; 
!d) That when a police officer who is making enquiries of any porson about an of( or."" hao 
enough e\•idenre to prefer a charge against that person for tho orrrr.><", he ohoutd l:l'itb· 
out delay cause that person to be charged or informed that he may be pro:l<'cutl'd (,,. 
the orrence; 
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suspects be informed of their right to remain silent but not only 
lacked a right to counsel but were and are enforced at the discretion 
of the trial judge who may choose to admit evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Rules. 
Accordingly, the Miranda warnings requirements had to be re-
garded as experimental and possibly dangerous to society. Even 
now it is difficult to judge how effective the warning requirements 
118 
(e) That it is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any person, 
equally of any oral answer given by that person to a question put by a police otricer and 
of any statement made by that person, that it shall have been voluntary, in the sense 
that it has not been obtained from him by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exer· 
cised or held out by a person in authority, or by oppression. 
The principle set out in paragraph (e) above is overriding and applicable In all cases. Within 
that principle the following Rules are put forward as a guide to pollee officers conducting in· 
vestigations. Non-conformity with these Rules may render answers and statements liable to bo 
excluded from evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. 
I. When a police officer is trying to discover whether, or by whom, an offence has boon 
committed he is entitled to question any person, whether suspected or not, from whom ho 
thinks that useful information may be obtained. This is so whether or not the person in quos· 
tion has been taken into custody so long as he has not been charged with the offence or In-
formed that he may be prosecuted for it. 
II. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for sUS· 
pecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to bo 
cautioned before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating to that offence. 
The caution shall be in the following terms:-
"You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may bo 
put into writing and given in evidence." 
When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a 
record shall be kept of the time and place at which any such questioning or statt>ment began 
and ended and of the persons present. 
!Il.(a) Where a person is charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offence 
he shall be cautioned in the following terms:-
" Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do 
so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence." 
(b) It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence should be put to tho 
accused person after he has been charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. Such quos· 
tions may be put where they are necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm or 
loss to some other person or to the public or for clearing up an ambiguity In a previous answer 
or statement. 
Before any such questions are put the accused should be cautioned in these terms:-
" I wish to put some questions to you about the offence with which you have been charged 
(or about the offence for which you may be prosecuted). You are not obliged to answer any 
of these questions, but if you do the questions and answers will be taken down in writing 
and may be given in evidence." 
Any questions put and answers given relating to the offence must be contemporaneously 
recorded in full and the record signed by that person or if he refuses by the interrogating 
officer. 
(c) When such a person is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a recor<l shall 
be kept of the time and place at which every questioning or statement began and ended and of 
the persons present. 
IV. All written statements made after caution shall be taken in the following mnnner:-
(a) If a person says that he wants to make a statement he shall be told that it is intended 
to make a written record of what he says. 
He shall always be asked whether he wisheo to write down himself what he wants to 
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are. 38 Of course there is every logical justification to require that 
suspects be warned of their right to remain silent if only because 
the fifth amendment privilege would seem a useless formality if 
suspects are not made aware of its existence. 
Another objection to thE' .Miranda decision has been that the 
Court seemingly abandoned its judicial role and functioned as a 
legislature. Certainly the specificity of its holding makes such a 
criticism highly telling. Yet the objection ignores the central issue. 
The Court certainly has the constitutional responsibility to interpret 
the Constitution. Arguably it may also have increased responsibility 
say; if he says that he cannot writt> or that hf' \\OUid IUo:t> "'(lmttonr t~;• untco It (ur h1m. 
a police officer may offer to write the Hatement for him. If hr 3CC't"pt• tl:o of{~r thr 
police officer shall. before startini:. af'.k thE' per:<on maklni: th._. ~tnttomcont tn "l(:n. •..1r 
make his mark to. the following--
.. I.------------ - - -· wish to m:~kP a ~tatl"mf'nt J uant 14Jmttonr:o to untt- th..~un 
what I say. I ha\·e been told that I need not say anything unl•., I u·'"h to 11•> "' ar.ll 
that what(>ver I ~ay may be gi\'Pn in e\·idlmC'E' •• 
(b) Any per.on writing his own statement shall be allowed to do •o without an) pro>mpun~: 
as distinct from indicating to him \\hat mattf'rs arf' matf'rial 
(c) The person making the statement. If he IS go1ng to wnte it hlm•rlf. •hall t.., Mkt'd to 
write out and sign before writing wh:1t he want"" to t><J.)'. tht> (oiiiJwin~:--
"1 make thi• statement of my own free "111 I ha\·~ b••n told that I nrt'd nnt "'>' 
anything unless J wish to do so and that whnt<•'•t'r 1 say may bf' h"l\"f!'n tn t>\'tt.!l"r.tt-. •• 
(d) Whenever a police offirer writes the statement, h• •hall take dou·n tb exart ..,..,,,Jo 
spoken by the pef'on making the statement. \\lthout putting ony qu•ouon• otl:•r than 
such as may be needed to make the otntement coh•l'l'nt. Intelligible nr.d relr\'ant tn th<" 
material matters: he shall not prompt hsm . 
(e) When the writing of a statement b~· " police offirer IS fini•hrd the prroon makln~: It 
shall be asked to read it and to make any correction•. :tltrrntion• or addltloM h• 
vdshes. When he has finished reading it he shall be asked to u·nt<> and sign or mnkr hi• 
mark on the following Certific:tte at the end of the 8tatem•nt·-
"l have read the abo\·e statement and I have been told that I ron corn-ct. olt<"r or 
add anything I wish. This statement is true I ho\'<' mod• It of my ou n free u-s II .. 
(/) If the person who has made a statement refus•s to r•nd it or to write tb ab<:l\·r mrn· 
tioned Certificate at the end of it or to sign it. the senior policr offi~r pre«"nl •hall 
record on the statement itself and in the presence of th• penon making lt. u hat ha• 
happened. If the per.on making the statement rnnnot rt'od. or r•fu5e• to rt'>.d 11. tb 
officer who bas taken it down shall rend it over to him and ask him whrtl::or bo ..,.auld 
like to correct, alter or add anything and to put his signature or mala• luo mark ot thr 
end. The police officer shall then certify on th• 6tatement itO<'If what br hM dor:r 
V. If at any time after a person has been charged "'it h. or ha. been informed that h<' may t>• 
prosecuted for an offence a police officer wishes to bnng to the notlC't" of that pen<on any U"Mt· 
ten statement made by another person who in respect of the rome offen«' boo abo l:>•rn 
charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. he shall hond to that penon n lnlr copy of ourh 
written statement. but nothing shall be said or done to in\'lte any rrply or "''mmrr.t. If that 
person says that he would like to make o statement in reply. or •tnrto to ""Y •oa:rtlung, hr 
shall at once be cautioned or further cautioned as prer.<ribed by Rule Ill to). 
VI. Persons other than police offioers charged with the duty of lnv•otil:llllnj; offer.••• or 
charging offender. shall. so far as may be prnrtirnbiP. romply with I bOt' Ruleo. 
HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR No. 31/1964, APP. A, JUDGES' RULES AND AD!.IINISTRA· 
TIVE DIRECTIONS TO THE POLICE (London, 1964) (hereinafter cited as JUDGES' 
RULES] . Note that the Administrative Directions ha\'e been omitted. 
38 See section XIII, infra. 
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in the area of the administration of justice. The Court had been con-
fronted with decades of coerced confessions. Faced with the percep-
tion that abuse of individual rights had taken a new and more 
difficult-to-detect turn-that psychological coercion was now super-
seding physical brutality-the Court chose the only instrument it 
could find to cope with its constitutional responsibilities. Further, it 
recognized the possibility of alternative forms of protection for the 
individual's right against self-incrimination and expressly noted that 
its decision was not meant to be the only acceptable solution. 
While the long term vitality of Miranda is questionable, 39 it not 
only is the law at present but also is highly likely to remain impor-
tant if not determinative in the future. Accordingly, the remainder 
of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the Miranda decision as 
it has been interpreted by the courts of the United States. 
V. THE MIRANDA REQUIREMENTS, 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Despite the Supreme Court's unusual attempt to be specific in the 
Miranda holding, the Court left open a substantial number of ques-
tions dealing with the application of its decision. Not only was there 
some doubt as to the exact nature of the warnings required, but 
more importantly it was unclear when the warnings had to be given. 
After all, the Court had used the words "custodial interrogation," 
words open to some debate. Was the question of an arresting officer 
on the street the type of "interrogation" that the Court had meant 
to include within Miranda's ambit? What test was to be used to 
determine the presence of custody? Was it a subjective test-and if 
so, was it the suspect's or policeman's view that was to be 
determinative-or an objective one? What manner of waiver was to 
be required? Was the case to be applied in a relaxed fashion or 
perhaps in a hyper-technical one? Further, what obligations did the 
decision place on the police when a suspect exercised his rights to 
remain silent? Could he be asked to reconsider and was any viola-
tion fatal in all ways to resulting evidence? These and other ques-
tions flowed from Miranda. 
In order to analyze best the contemporary interpretation of 
Miranda, the following questions will be addressed in turn: 
39 !d. 
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What warnings must be given? 
Who must give warnings? 
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Who must receive warnings? 
When must warnings be given? 
How is the Mimnda waiver obtained? 
What is the effect of exercising one's Miranda rights? 
VI. THE MIRANDA WARNINGS 
At first impression, the Court would seem to have been more than 
adequately specific in its rendition of the warnings required by 
Miranda. The Court's language states: "the person must be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right 
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 40 
Later in the opinion, the Court makes it clear that the latter warn-
ing means not only that the suspect has a right to consult with an 
attorney, but that "if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to 
represent him." 41 Beyond this the opinion is silent. 
Despite the seeming clarity of the Miranda requirements, 
numerous courts have been compelled to interpret the validity of 
variations on the Miranda commandments. Most of these cases 
would appear to have been concerned with the right-to-counsel 
warning although a respectable number of cases exist considering 
the other warnings and suggesting that still further warnings may 
be necessary. 
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Miranda requires that a suspect entitled to warnings be warned 
that he has a right to have an attorney present during the interro-
gation and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed 
for him. 42 Failure to advise a suspect of his right to _f1·ee counsel is 
usually considered noncompliance with Mimnda 43 and fatal to the 
admissibility of any resulting statement. 44 
While the use of the word "attorney" rather than "lawyer" has 
40 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966). 
41 I d. at 473. 
42 I d. 
43 See United States v. Cullinan, 396 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ill. 1975); People v. 
Hermance, 35 N.Y. 2d 915,324 N.E. 2d 367, _ N.Y.S.2d _ (1974). Note Bat· 
teaste v. State, _Ala. App. _, 331 So. 2d 832 (Ct. Crim. App. 1976), holding 
that the warning that if the suspect cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed 
for him need not include the specific statement that such a lawyer will be "'free of 
charge." 
44 See Commonwealth v. Bomberger, 454 Pa. 279, 347 A.2d 460 (1975). For an 
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been controverted, there appears little general objection to the use 
of the term attorney. Far more important has been the question of 
exactly when the right to counsel attaches in relation to the warning 
given by the police to the suspect. The suspect has a right to consult 
with counsel before interrogation and to have counsel present dur-
ing the interrogation. No interrogation may take place if the suspect 
wants a lawyer until counsel is supplied. 
A number of courts have determined that the failure to advise 
suspects of their right to con::::ult with counsel prior to interrogation 
does not constitute error when the right to have counsel present 
during the interrogation is made clear. 45 Presumably the right to 
consult with counsel is subsumed in the general right to counsel in 
most courts. 
Cases in which the police warning has suggested that the right to 
counsel might attach at some substantially later time have proven 
far more troublesome. In the usual case the suspect is either ad-
vised that a court will appoint counsel if needed or, "We have no 
way of giving you a lawyer if you cannot afford one, but one may be 
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." 46 As 
the accused has both an absolute right to remain silent and the right 
to have counsel present to assist during any interrogation to which 
the suspect voluntarily consents, such a warning means only that a 
suspect desiring appointed counsel cannot be interrogated until 
counsel i~ available. In short, the only option that is foreclosed is 
that of making an "immediate" statement with the assistance of 
counsel. 
However, the usual warning that refers to a future right to coun-
sel is confusing at best and creates a substantial risk of leading a 
suspect to believe that no effective right to appointed counsel exists 
at the interrogation. The courts are divided completely insofar as 
the propriety of admitting statements obtained after warning indi-
cating that counsel is not immediately available. 47 Although final 
interesting decision, see United States v. Cullinan, 396 F. Supp. 516 at 518 (N.D. 
Ill. 1975), holding that failure to warn a suspect of his right to free counsel in the 
event of indigency would be harmless if the prosecution could present adequate 
proof of the suspect's ability to afford to retain counsel. 
45 See United States v. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1974); State v. Ralls, 167 
Conn. 408, 356 A.2d 147 (1974); Sands v. State, 542 P.2d 209 (Okla. 1975). 
46 Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 214, 234 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1975). 
47 See Wright v. North Carolina, 415 U.S. 936 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting from 
denial of a petition for grant of a writ of certiorari) and cases cited therein. Notl' 
that both federal and state courts are divided on this issue. See also Note, Crimi· 
nal Procedure: Miranda Warning and the Right to "Instant Counsel"-A Grow-
ing Schism, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 957 (1976). 
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resolution of the issue awaits future decisions, a trend towards ac-
ceptance of statements given after warnings of this kind seems to be 
developing. 48 It is interesting to note that while the American Law 
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure expressly 
recognizes a warning that counsel will be appointed at a later time, 
it does so in an unusually clear and forthright manner that should 
cure most of the defects surrounding the present formulations. 49 
B. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
Perhaps the most important Miranda warning is that the suspect 
"has the right to remain silent, and that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him." 50 The basic warning 
itself is simple and difficult to abuse. However, a number of formu-
lations have been used by various jurisdictions to explain the right 
to remain silent. No specific phrasing seems required so long as the 
right to remain silent is sufficiently communicated to the accused. 51 
Occasionally police efforts to suggest that the suspect may refrain 
from incriminating himself but may not remain silent, or that the 
suspect may be char~ed with misprision of felony if he is not in-
volved and remains silent, are improper and will result in suppres-
sion of any resulting statement. 52 
48 See Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alas. 1973) (police officer was only telling 
the truth); United States v. Rawls, 322 A.2d 903 <D.C. 1974); State v. ~.laluia, 56 
Hawaii 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975); Arnold , .. State, 548 P.2d 65!1 tUkla. 1971.iJ; 
Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 234 N. W.2d 316 (1975). But see Hock\'. Statl!, 
_Ark. _, 531 S.W.2d 701 (1976) (warning valid on the facts of tht.> case but 
would be invalid for indigents); People v. Buckler, 39 N. Y.2d 895, 352 N.E.2d 5S3, 
386 N. Y.S.2d 396 (1976). A numbt.>r of courts have accepted statements using 
these warnings but have done so with deep concern. St•c Gremlier, supra. 
49 No law enforcement officer shall question an arrest<'<! p<>rson aft~r h~ has l:<~~n brou~bl loth-
police station or otherwise attempt to induce him to mak<> a •tat~m~nl unl~rs be bas t>..-.,n 
advised by the station officer in plain understandable lan!(lla~:• id that If he "',.he• l" 
consult a lawyer or to have a la\\yer pres.ent dunng questicntng. but 1ti- unnblt" to obt.o:un one.-. bt" 
will not be questioned until a lawyer ha• been pro,•ided for him. •uch ad\'1«' •hall a!,., 1r.du.Jc 
information on how he may arrange to havE' a lawyer t'O pro\·tdt>d 
ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(1Jlc) (1975). 
50 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966). 
51 See Commonwealth v. Spriggs, 463 Pa. 375, ____ , 344 A.2d 88U, 882-82 11975! 
(warning that "you have the right to refuse to answer questions asked of you while 
you are in custody ... " was sufficient to convey the right to remain silent despite 
the failure to use the word "statement"). 
52 See United States v. Williams, 2 C.M.A. 430, 9 C . .M.R. 60 (1953) Ideals with the 
military's statutory analogue to Miranda); United States''· Allen, 48 C.~I.R. 474 
(A.C.M.R. 1974). 
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C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING 
A STATEMENT 
Under the Miranda formulation, an interrogator must advise his 
suspect that any statement made "may be used as evidence against 
him." 53 Variations of the warning have used "will," "could," 
or "might" in place of the word "may" in the warning. 54 Stating that 
any comments "will be used against you" certainly provides the sus-
pect with the strongest warning. However, it fails to take into ac-
count the possibility that the evidence might be used for the ac-
cused. Paralleling the Miranda formulation, the English Judges' 
Rules provide that an interrogating constable must tell a suspect 
that anything he may say "may be put into writing and given in 
evidence." 55 Telling the American suspect that his statement might 
be used for him may, however, be considered an improper induce-
ment which will render a statement involuntary. 5 6 
D. OTHER WARNINGS 
While Miranda set forth a number of required rights warnings, 
defense counsel have frequently argued that given cases require a 
number of additional warnings not specifically spelled out in the de-
cision. 
Perhaps the most common additional warning said by the defense 
to be required is that the suspect who has chosen to make a state-
ment may choose to change his mind at any time and remain silent. 
While there is no doubt that the suspect may indeed . invoke the 
right to remain silent at any time during interrogation, 57 Miranda 
does not require that suspects be advised of that right to terminate 
an interview, so long as their decision to stop talking is respected;58 
accordingly, the courts have almost unanimously denied the defense 
claim that such a warning is required. 59 
53 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966). 
54 See generally Kamisar supra note 21, at 570-71. 
55 JUDGES' RULES, supra note 37, Rules II, III & IV. 
56 See KAIIUSAR supra note 21, at 570-71 for a discussion of this issue. 
5 7 384 u.s. 436, 473-74 (1966). 
5 8 /d. at 444-45, 467-70, 473-74. 
59 See Crowe v. State, 54 Ala. App. 121, 305 So. 2d 396 (Ct. Crim. App. 1974); 
State v. Cobbs, 164 Conn. 402, 418-19, 324 A.2d 234, 244, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
861 (1973); State v. Sherwood, 139 N.J. Super. 201, 204-05, 353 A.2d 137, 139 
(1976); Commonwealth v. Alston, 456 Pa. 128, 317 A.2d 241 (1974); State v. Har-
baugh, 132 Vt. 569, 577-78, 326 A.2d 821, 836 (1975); 
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Perhaps more important is the occasional defense claim that the 
suspect should be notified of sufficient facts to allow him to make an 
intelligent decision insofar as waiver is concerned. At a minimum, 
some counsel have argued, the suspect should be told of the nature 
of the offense of which he is suspected. 60 Others have argued that 
surrounding circumstances should be disclosed, such as whether the 
crime is a felony or misdemeanor; or whether a victim has died or 
been seriously injured. If evidence indicates that the suspect has 
been able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, most courts 
have held that information as to either the nature of the offense or 
of surrounding circumstances is not required. 61 
While it seems unreasonable to require the police to give a com-
plete briefing to a suspect prior to requesting a statement, there 
would appear to be no reason not to require the police to warn a 
suspect of the basic nature of the offense of which he is suspected. 
Such an approach has been in use in the military since 1951 62 and 
has not proven detrimental to investigation. 
An additional warning that has been discussed by a number of 
noted commentators 63 is the statement that the silence of an ac-
cused will not be used against him. In the light of recent Supreme 
Court decisions, 64 that warning would now be legally true insofar as 
admission of evidence of a warned witness' silence at trial is con-
cerned. However, as Professors Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel point 
out, 65 the accused's silence may well have detrimental effects in-
60 See U.C.M.J. art. 3l(b), requiring that a suspect be advised of the nature of the 
offense of which he is suspected. The warning need not be overly specific or tech· 
nical (e.g., "you are suspected of killing Smith" is enough). Miller v. State. __ 
Ind._, 335 N.E.2d 206 (1975). 
61 See State v. Kenner, _ La. _, 290 So. 2d 299 (1974) (defendant was not 
entitled to be warned that he was confessing to a felony); People v. Lewis, 43 App. 
Div. 2d 989, 352 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1974) (defendant was not entitled to be warned 
that the rape victim had died); State v. Owen, 13 Wash. App. 146, 149, 534 P.2d 
123, 125 (1975) (general nature of charges against defendant are required). But 
see People v. Prude, 32 Ill. App. 3d 410, 415-17, 336 N.E.2d 348, 352-54 (1975) 
(juvenile suspects should have been warned of the possibility of trial for murder in 
normal adult courts); Harris v. Commonwealth, _ Va. __ , _ S.E.2d __ • 20 
Crim. L. Rep. 2529 (Va. March 4, 1977) (interrogator was not required to warn 
juvenile that he might be prosecuted as an adult). 
62See note 60 supra; see generally Lederer, Rights War11i11gs i11 tile .-\n11ed Srrt•· 
ices, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
63See note 56 supra. 
64Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). 
See generally Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Testimo11y By Proof of Post· 
Arrest Silence: Doyle v. Ohio, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 261 (1976). 
65See note 56 supra. 
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sofar as police decision making is concerned. Despite this, and inas-
much as most suspects feel a psychological necessity to speak (the 
underlying assumption of Miranda), one would think that a warning 
that the suspect's silence may not be used against him at trial would 
be desirable. It would at least minimize the inherent compulsion 
that Miranda deals with. However, such a warning does not appear 
to be required at this time and it would seem most unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would even consider extending Miranda. 
VII. WHEN ARE MIRANDA 
WARNINGS REQUIRED? 
For purposes of analysis the Miranda rule may be stated thusly: 
Warnings are required whenever a law enforcement agent subjects 
a suspect to custodial interrogation. The key terms are law en-
forcement agent, suspect, and custodial interrogation. It is criti-
cally important, however, to keep in mind that Miranda by defini-
tion applies only to those forms of communication protected by the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, a 
number of actions that would appear to be "incriminating'' in terms 
of consequence are not within Miranda's ambit. Examples of unpro-
tected actions include the taking of handwriting and voice exemp-
lars, 66 bodily fluids, 67 and obtaining consent to search. 68 Similarly, 
compelled psychiatric examinations normally will not require 
Miranda warnings. 69 For analytical purposes, these unprotected ac-
tions can best be viewed as not coming within the definition of "in-
terrogation" for Miranda purposes. 70 
66 See People v. Henderson,_ Mich. App. _, _, 245 N.W. 2d 72, 74 (1974) 
(Miranda warnings held unnecessary when obtaining voice samples, as voice 
exemplars are unprotected by the fifth amendment). 
67Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1967) (bodily fluids not protected by the 
right against self-incrimination). 
68Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Miranda warnings or warning 
of the right to refuse to give consent are not required for a valid consent search). 
69 At present the majority rule is that an accused intending to raise a defense of 
insanity can be compelled to submit to a government psychiatric examination. The 
defendant in such a case is said to have impliedly waived his privilege to the ex-
tent necessary to allow the examination and to allow the examining psychiatrist to 
testify at trial as to his conclusions. Miranda warnings are thus inappropriate. 
For a reappraisal of this view, see Comment, Miranda on the Couch: An Ap-
proach to Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel, and Miranda Warn-
ings in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of Criminal Defendants, 11 COLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 403 (1975). 
70Note that matters protected by the privilege may still escape Miranda because 
of other circumstances. See State v. Gwaltney,_ N.C. App. _, 228 S.E.2d 764 
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A. WHO MUST GNE MIRANDA WARNINGS? 
The Miranda warnings were designed to offset the psychological 
coercion assumed to be inherent in custodial questioning by law en-
forcement agents. 71 Generally, the cases have required police offi-
cers, prosecutors, and law enforcement agents with ofticial status to 
give warnings, 72 and exempted private citizens from the warning 
requirements. 73 Part-time police and private security guards pose 
some difficulty. The primary question appears to be the existence of 
status as a local, state or federal officer. 74 Thus, cases involving 
private guards will frequently require a determination of the 
guard's arrest powers under local law. As one commentator has 
stated,75 the private citizen exception to Miranda will generally not 
apply to citizens acting as police agents. 76 While police officers must 
give warnings before conducting custodial interrogations, under-
(1976) (accident report questions did not require Mira11da warningt> because the 
questions were investigatory rather than accusatory and thus were not within the 
scope of Miranda). 
71384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966). 
72See generally, J. ZAGEL, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS AFTER ~IIRANDA: 
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDELINE OF THE LAW 46-47 (1972). 
73See, e.g., Reno v. State,_ Ala. App. __ , 337 So.2d 122 (Ct. Crim. App. Hl76) 
(company officer); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, ___ Mass. ___ , 335 N.E.2d 660 
(1974) (vigilante group of private citizens were not required to give warnings to 
suspect subjected to custodial interrogation); Brown v. State, ___ ~liss. ___ , 293 
So.2d 425 (1974) (jail cell questioning by victim's mother did not require .\liranda 
warnings when the conversation was not instigated by the police). 
740fficial status or a significant police connection will require warnings. Compare 
Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alas. 1973) (private arson investigator who was a 
former police officer and who worked closely with the police and considered him-
self part of the "team" was required to give warnings); and Allen \". State, 52 Ala. 
App. 66, 297 So.2d 391 (Ala. Crim. App.), c-ert. denied, 292 Ala. 707, 297 So.2d 
399 (1974) (interrogator who had occasionally acted as a part-time deputy sheriff 
in the past had sufficient connections with the sheriff that warnings should have 
been given) with United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974) !although 
interrogating newsman had acted as a part-time unpaid deputy sheriff, hit> past 
activities had been restricted to acting as a photographer, press secretary, or 
helping to search for drowning victims; accordingly, he was not a law enforcement 
agent for Miranda purposes). 
75J. ZAGEL, supra note 72, at-· 
76Citizens acting as police agents may have to give warnings. Compare People v. 
Baugh, 19 Ill. App. 3d 448, 311 N.E.2d 607 (1975) (victim's attorney who ques-
tioned suspect in police custody was acting as a police agent and he should have 
given .Miranda warnings) with State v. Jensen, 11 Ariz. 408, 531 P.2d 531 (1975) 
(prisoners who obtained a statement from cellmate were not "plants" and could 
testify to statements made by the accused). Note that a person investigating mis-
conduct who is not a law enforcement agent may not have to give warnings despite 
holding an official position. See In re Brendan H .• 82 Misc. 2d 1977,372 N.Y.S.2d 
473 (Schenectady Fam. Ct. 1975) (school principal investigating school misconduct 
not required to give warnings to students in the absence of police connection). 
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cover agents are usually exempted from the warning requirement 
simply because u11dercover work normally does not involve C'ltsto-
dial interrogation. 7 7 
There are, of course, a number of persons likely to question a 
suspect as part of the law enforcement process who are not them-
selves law enforcement agents. Cases involving clerical personnel 
should be analyzed in terms of the status of the clerk, the purpose of 
the questioning, and the general policies served by Miranda. Gov-
ernment psychiatrists performing competency examinations, par-
ticularly examinations in response to sanity defenses, should 
theoretically present a problem, as the information gained from the 
suspect may well be used against him. However, inasmuch as the 
courts have nearly unanimously held that a suspect raising a sanity 
defense must consent to a government examination, 78 there would 
77If one were to be concerned only with questions of fairness there would appelll' 
to be some question why undercover agents should be allowed to question suspects 
without warnings when uniformed officers would be prevented from doing so. 
However, this avoids the rationale for Miranda. Undercover agents questioning 
suspects in a noncustodial setting by definition do not create the type of coercive 
atmosphere found in a police station. 
78There has been general implicit acceptance that compelled psychiatric examinn-
tion of this kind, usually on pain of preventing the defense from presenting all or 
part of its evidence on sanity, involves the types of coercion that allows the 
privilege to be invoked. However, the courts have distinguished the situation 
from the usual attempt to obtain incriminating testimony by concentrating on the 
intent and justification behind the examination. The overwhelming majority rule 
in the United States today is that when a defendant intends to raise a sanity de-
fense he has impliedly waived in part his privilege against self-incrimination. Sec 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c); United States v. Jines, No. 76-1102 (8th Cir. filed 1976); 
United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526 
F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Barrera, 486 F.2d 333, 338-39 (2d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974); United States v. Mattson, 469 F.2d 1234, 
1236 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Babbidge, 18 
C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969); Lewis v. Thulemeyer, 538 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1975); 
Noyes v. State, 516 P.2d 1368 (Okla. 1973). But see United States v. Alvarez, 519 
F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Aronson, Should the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. 
REV. 55 (1973); Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RUT. L. REV. 489 (1965); Lede1·er, 
Rights Warnings in the Military, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Requiring a 
Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An 
Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV. 648 
(1970). Under the decisions, the defendant must submit to a government psychin-
trist (who need not give Miranda warnings) but who will not be allowed to testify 
at trial to any specific incriminating remarks made during the interview and must 
limit himself to his conclusions on the issue of sanity. See United States v. Bohle, 
445 F .2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1967). Note that Virginia allows a coerced examina-
tion as long as the defendant is not forced to answer questions regarding the of-
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appear to be no reason for warnings to be given. 79 
Foreign police have not been required to give Miranda warn-
ings 80 when interrogating an American suspect if only because the 
United States cannot compel foreign jurisdictions to comply with 
American law. Clearly the prophylactic function served by Mimnda 
domestically is irrelevant in foreign jurisdications with their own 
legal rules. This is not, however, to suggest that Mimnda should 
not apply to foreign investigations which are conducted in conjunc-
tion with American authorities and are simply part and parcel of an 
American investigation. 81 American efforts to circumvent the 
Miranda requirements are to be discouraged. However, this ap-
proach creates a substantial risk of deterring American prosecution 
and leaving the American accused in the hands of foreign au-
thorities. The balance is yet to be struck. 
B. SUSPECT 
While it is possible to have a custodial interrogation of a person 
who is not a suspect, 82 by the very nature of American law the 
number of custodial interrogations of nonsuspects will be extremely 
low. After all, if a person is not a suspect, what justification will the 
fense with which he is charged. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S.E.2d 
845 (1975). Refusal by the defendant to submit may result in an adverse inference. 
preclusion of the use of defense expert witnesses. preclusion of the entire sanity 
defense, or perhaps even contempt. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), paras. 122(b) (2); 140(a) (2); 150(b), as ameuded by Exec. 
Order No. 11,835, 40 Fed. Reg. 4,247 (1975), reprinted as Change 1, ~~C~I 1969 
(Rev.). 
79\Vhere no right to remain silent exists there can be no reason for warning of its 
existence. However, the right to counsel at psychiatric examinations is not totally 
foreclosed and in those few jurisdictions recognizing a limited right to counsel 
some form of rights warning would seem appropriate. 
80See United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 907 OOth Cir. 1974) <Miranda warn-
ings were not required in Peruvian investigation despite American participation in 
absence of American officers playing a "substantial role in events leading to the 
arrest"). 
81 See Cranford v. Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975) (Mexican police acting 
on behalf of New Mexico police should have given Miranda warnings). 
82A person in custody for one offense might be questioned merely as a witness to a 
second. Assuming that the questions relating to the second offense could not in 
any way touch on the first, a rather abstract and unlikely situation in \'iew of the 
possibility of derivative evidence and the use of any information gained for im-
peachment and related uses, by implication Miranda would not appear to apply, 
as its purpose was to protect suspects from questioning. Note that the .fact of 
custody is the determining feature for a suspect. Ih is unimportant that he is in 
custody for another offense so long as he is a supect. See Mathis\'. United States, 
391 u.s. 1 (1968). 
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authorities have to hold him in custody? Thus, normally, and in con-
trast to the statutory warning requirements 83 of military criminal 
law, the threshold question will often be whether the person ques-
tioned was in custody and not whether he was a suspect. The cases 
frequently exhibit in this regard an ambiguous use of the word 
"focus." While courts often attempt to determine if an investigation 
has "focused" on an individual to determine whether he was in cus-
tody at the time of questioning, the same question is also asked to 
determine whether the person questioned was truly a suspect at the 
time of interrogation. The two separate criteria for Mimnda appli-
cation are thus frequently merged, and careful analysis may be 
needed to distinguish a court's true holding. 
C. CUSTODY 
Miranda's use of the expression "custodial interrogation" is de-
ceptively simplistic. The case defines it as "questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way." 84 The problems engendered by this formulation can be 
grouped into two areas-the test to be applied in defining custody, 
and the determination of the presence of custody once a test has 
been arrived at. 
The difficulty in arriving at a test is caused by Miranda's basic 
premise. If the warnings are to cope with psychological coercion felt 
by the suspect, the test at least arguably should be a subjective one 
that seeks to determine whether the suspect believed himself to be 
in custody. While such an approach may most fully implement 
Miranda's apparent intent, it may unreasonably open the door to 
perjury by the defendant. Similarly, the test makes determinative 
the suspect's perhaps unreasonable view of the situation. While 
there is much to be said for requiring warnings whenever a doubtful 
situation may exist, it was clearly not the intent of the Court in 
Miranda to foreclose all police questioning without warnings; and 
this could easily be the result of a purely subjective test. 
An alternative test that was chosen by some jurisdictions after 
83The statutory military rights warnings, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1970), apply, for 
example, whenever a suspect or accused is to be questioned without any require-
ment that the individual be in custody. Determination of whether a person was in 
fact a suspect becomes in the military a question of fact. 
84384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Note that in the deleted footnote which follows the 
quote, the Court stated, "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an 
investigation which had focused on an accused." 
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Miranda was that of the police o[{ice1·'s view of the 8ituation. 85 Thi8 
subjective test eliminated unreasonable perceptions of the accused 
but substituted the perhaps unreasonable view of the police officer. 
If the purely subjective tests are to be discarded, one is left with 
variations on an objective test. Two major variants seem possible: 
whether the defendant was in fact in custody-a purely objectiv~ 
test;86 and, bearing in mind the accused's age, intellect, experience, 
physical condition, and so forth, whether he reasonably believed 
that he was in fact in custody_B? This latter version has the advan-
tage of taking into account the very factors that Miranda and its 
predecessors considered important. 
The extent to which a jurisdiction may utilize any specific test i8 
difficult to determine because of the necessity for a case-by-case ap-
proach and because of a tendency to use ambiguous language in de-
cisions. A plurality of American jurisdictions seemingly using a 
single test appear to employ one or another type of objective stand-
ard to determine the presence of custody. 
Many jurisdictions choose to use what they characterize a8 a 
"focus" test. 88 Deriving its origins from Escobedo t~. Illinois, 89 this 
test in its purest sense (one seldom applied) attempts to determine 
whether the individual questioned was in fact the "focus" or central 
point of the investigation. The focus test, as a definitional test for 
85This test led to the question of the interrogating officer: "Would you have lf.'llhl' 
defendant leave?" No jurisdiction uses this test alone today. 
86See J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alas. 1975); State v. Thomas, 22 N.l'. App. 
206, 206 S.E.2d 390 (1974). 
870r as often expressed-reasonably believe that he was free to leave. United 
States v. Luther, 521 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1975). See State v. l\layes, llO Ariz. 318, 
518 P.2d 568 (1974); People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, l16 Cal. Rptr. 641, 
_ P.2d _ (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Parada, ___ Col. _., 533 P.2d 
1121 (1975); State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976); /11 re Brendan H., 82 ~lise. 
2d 1077,372 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Fam. Ct. 1975); Commonwealth v. Fit-1her, _ . Pa. _ . 
352 A.2d 26 (1976) (note that Pennsylvania uses both an objective test and the 
subjective view of the suspect, the positive results of either resulting in custody; 
see Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713 (1974)); Jordan \'. Com· 
monwealth, 216 Va. 768, 222 S.E. 2d 573 (1976). 
88See Moore v. State, 54 Ala. App. 22, 304 So. 2d 263 (('rim. App. 1974); Reeves 
v. State,_ Ark._, 528 S.W.2d 924 (1975); People v. Dunn, 31111. App. 3d 854, 
334 N .E.2d 866 (1975); State v. Carson, 216 Kan. 711, 533 P .2d 1342 11975); State 
v. Ned,_ La._, 236 So.2d 477 (1976); People v. Langley, 63 !llich. App. 3:l9, 
234 N.W.2d 513 (1975); State v. Raymond,_ Minn. __ , 232 N.W.2d 879 (1975); 
State v. Simpson,_ Utah 2d _, 541 P.2d 1114 (1975). 
89See note 84 supra. It seems likely that the Supreme Court was attempting 
through Miranda's footnote 4 to bring Escobedo into line with .Uiranda. While it 
may be possible to do so, the attempt is difficult at bet-1t and Mircnzda is better 
viewed as having created a new test for when warnings are required. 
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custody, has apparently been disavowed by the Supreme Court. 90 
Cleansed, however, of its confusion with custody, focus remains a 
viable test to determine whether a person questioned was in fact a 
suspect, 91 and it may well be that use of the term that explains the 
frequent reference to focus in many of the opinions. 
Following focus in popularity, is the variety-of-factors 
approach. 92 Perhaps best characterized by the fifth circuit's formu-
lation, this test seeks to determine custody through a four-part ap-
proach: whether the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect; 
whether it was the officer's intent to hold the suspect in custody; 
whether the suspect believed that he was not free to leave; whether 
the investigation had focused on the suspect. 93 This approach allows 
the court to handle on an individual basis each case in which a for-
mal arrest is lacking. While phrased in many fashions, many opin-
ions in this area appear to follow a multi-factor approach leading to 
the distinct possibility that no majority rule exists in the nation 
today insofar as a specific definitional test for custody is concerned. 
Regardless of the test adopted, the court in any specific case must 
determine whether the interrogated defendant was in custody. This 
is without question a matter totally dependent upon the facts of the 
case. Factors which have been considered important in this deter-
mination include the place of interrogation;94 when the questioning 
90Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). In Beckwith, a case involving 
the failure of IRS special agents to give warnings to the suspect whom they inter-
viewed in a private home, the Court did concede the possiblity that "noncustodial 
interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some special circum-
stances, be characterized as one where the 'behavior of ... law enforcement offi-
cials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions 
not freely self-determined.'" 425 U.S. at 347-48 (citation omitted). While the fail-
ure to give warnings in such a case would be relevant, it would not be fatal. Ser 
also United States v.Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1975). 
91 See Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del. 1973) (questioning of fam-
ily member whose relatives had died in an arson related fire were not part of nn 
investigation which had focused on him); State v. Martin, 277 Minn. 470,212 N.W. 
2d 847 (1973) (police simply wanted to know why defendant was in vacant apart-
ment); State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973) (sheriff asked pris-
oner what had happened to fellow prisoner lying in a pool of blood; incriminatory 
answer came from nonsuspect (no focus)). 
92See Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308 (1976); State v. Kalai, 56 Hawaii 
366, 537 P.2d 8 (1975); State v. Williams, 522 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); 
State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168,329 A.2d 75 (App. Div.), affd, 67 N.J. 267, 
337 A.2d 371 (1974); State v. Gill, 24 Ore. App. 541, 546 P.2d 786 (1976); Ancira v. 
State, 516 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1974). 
93See United States v. Carollo, 507 F.2d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1975); B1·own v. Beto, 468 
F .2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972). 
94While a custodial interrogation may take place in the suspect's home, see Orozco 
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took place;95 persons present, and the existence or absence of a 
formal arrest;96 use of weapons or other physical restraint; whether 
the interview was initiated by the suspect or police;97 whether the 
suspect attended the interview voluntarily;98 whether the suspect 
was or felt free to leave the interrogation, and the length and na-
ture of the interrogation itself. The mere fact that a person has been 
questioned by the police does not in and of itself create a custodial 
interrogation. 99 Accordingly, all the factors listed above may be rel-
evant in determining whether custody existed for Jfh·a nda 
purposes. 
The language of Miranda in speaking of any "sign{{icant" inter-
ference with the suspect's freedom of action is the key to the deter-
mination of custody. When the suspect has been formally arrested 
and brought to the police station house the determination is usually 
simple. Generally, it is only when the defendant has been ques-
tioned without an arrest, and usually outside the station house, that 
the numerous factors discussed above become critical. 100 
D. INTERROGATION-THE HEART OF lv!IRANDA 
The Miranda warnings are designed to protect against coercive 
interrogation. The meaning of "interrogation" has tended, however, 
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Commonwealth v. Borodine, ___ .Mass. ___ , :353 
N.E.2d 649 (1976), such a location is very likely to weigh heavily in a finding of no 
custody. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973). See Beckwith 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Roberts v. State, __ Miss. ___ , 301 So.2d 
859 (1974) (suspect's front yard); State v. Starkey, 536 S.W. 2d 8.58 (~to. App. 
1976) (suspect's home). 
95See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713 0974). 
96The Supreme Court has found the lack of a formal arrest to be of great-perhaps 
determinative-significance in a case involving the "voluntary" interrogation of a 
parolee. Oregon v. Mathiason,_ U.S. __ , 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (finding ,\lira11da 
inapplicable). The Court's opinion suggests that the future may see .\lira11da lim· 
ited to formal arrest situations that involve station house interrogations. 
91 See United States v. Victor Standing Soldier, ___ F.2d __ (8th Cir. 1976). 
98See People v. Wipfler, 37 IlL App. 3d 400, 346 N.E.2d 41 (1976); Commonwealth 
v. Simpson,_ Mass._, _, 345 N.E.2d 899, 904 0976). This factor is by no 
means conclusive. See State v. Mathiason, 275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976) lvolun· 
tary attendance overcome by coercive environment and circum!ltances). 
99For example, a recognized "exception" to Miranda exists for "general inves· 
tigative questioning," a police officer's general questions at the scene of the of· 
fense. Despite the term "exception," frequently these cases are ones in which a 
suspect does not yet exist (the investigation has not yet "focused" on someone) or 
the individuals questioned are not in custody. See State v. Kalai, 56 Hawaii. 366, 
537 P.2d 8 (1975); People v. Langley, 63 Mich. App. 339, 234 N. W.2d 513 (1975); 
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 0976). 
100See generally J. ZAGEL, supra note 72, at 12-36, for a complete list of factors 
with accompanying citation. 
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to become a term of art and defies easy definition. In its usual 
sense, interrogation for Miranda purposes refers to police question-
ing designed to elicit a response from a suspect. More than simple 
questioning is included, however. Any statement or action designed 
to elicit an incriminating response will be considered interroga-
tion.101 Whether a statement or physical act will indeed be consid-
ered interrogation will be determined on the facts of each individual 
case. 102 
Clearly exempted from Miranda's definition of interrogation, 
however, are volunteered or spontaneous statements. 103 If a sus-
pect should initiate a statement or should respond to entirely neu-
tral or innocuous questioning or statements with an incriminating 
comment, the comment is admissible io4 and the police need not 
101 See Blackmon v. Blackledge, 396 F. Supp. 296, 299 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (confront-
ing defendant suddenly after four hours of police interrogation with witness who 
accused him of murder was a form of interrogation requiring warnings). Some 
courts have held confrontations not to be interrogations. 
102Police statements or actions are likely to be found to be noninterrogative. See 
United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1976) (police remark to suspect 
that a search warrant would be applied for after arrest was not an interrogation, 
and suspect's subsequent admission and surrender of evidence was not in violation 
of Miranda); United States v. Martin, 511 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1975) (police com-
ment to defendant during search that they had arrived a day or so late to search 
was not an interrogation and the defendant's resulting admission was acceptable 
in evidence); People v. Mangum,_ Colo. _, 539 P.2d 120 (1975) (police state-
ment to suspect that electronic equipment had had its serial number obliterated 
was not interrogation just as officer's greeting of the suspect was not); State v. 
Burton, 22 N.C. App. 559, 207 S.E.2d 344 (1974) (officer's act of handing white hat 
discovered at the scene of the crime to the defendant at the police station was not 
interrogation; defendant's acknowledgement of ownership did not violate 
Miranda). But see People v. Paulin, 61 Misc. 2d 289, 305 N. Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct.), 
affd, 33 App. Div. 2d 105, 308 N.Y.S.2d 883, affd, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d 
164, 366 N. Y .S.2d 929 (1969) (police statements concerning victim's death hold to 
be interrogation). See also Brewer v. Williams,_ U.S._, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287 
(1977) (police transporting murder defendant emphasized to him the terrible 
weather and the fact that his victim's body was abandoned in it without Christian 
burial; the Court found this to be interrogation). 
1<m384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). See Garcia v. State,_ Ind. App. 2d _, 304 N.E.2d 
812 (1973) (statement by rape suspect: "It wasn't rape, it was assault with a 
friendly weapon" was admissible without warnings); State v. Hobson, __ Minn. 
_, 244 N.W.2d 654 (1976) (defendant refused to leave the police station without 
"his" gun; volunteered statement held admissible to establish possession of stolen 
weapon); Commonwealth v. Boone, _ Pa. _, 354 A.2d 898 (1975) (defendant 
asked policeman if he had heard what had happened; after his negative reply he 
told defendant they were going to the homicide division; she then admitted stab-
bing); State v. Valez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) (as officer began to read 
the warnings to the defendant he volunteered: "You don't have to ask, I shot 
her."). See generally J. ZAGEL, supra note 72 at 37-40. 
0 
104See People v. Potter, 20 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1054-55, 314 N.E.2d 201, 205 (1974) 
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inten-upt the statement with Mi1·anda warnings. 105 Further it ap-
pears probable, although the issue has not yet been finally resolved, 
that once a spontaneous statement begins the police may seek to 
have it continue or to flesh it out with neutral questioning. 
The spontaneous statement exception to Mi1·anda is difficult 
theoretically. 106 If Miranda presumes that the psychological coer-
cion of custody requires an offsetting warning, the same coercive 
atmosphere would seem to compel a suspect to make volunteered 
statements to seek police approval. Removing volunteered state-
ments from Miranda's coverage is thus inconsistent with its basic 
rationale. 107 However, the exception appears to be too well ac-
cepted to be modified at this stage. 
Miranda and its related cases 108 dealt primarily with station 
house interrogations or their equivalent. Thus, the extent to which 
its comparatively broad holding involving custodial interrogations 
involved non-station-house questioning was unclear. It is now ap-
parent that questioning a suspect in police custody will generally 
trigger the warning requirements regardless of the location of the 
questioning. However, a number of types of street encounter are 
not covered by Miranda. 
Miranda expressly recognized the need for police investigation: 
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime 
or other general questioning of citizens in the fact finding process is 
not affected by our holding." 109 The authors of the opinion seem to 
(deputy sheriff attempted to quiet a prisoner and had a neutral conversation with 
him; prisoner's volunteered statement that "he was going to con them like a snake 
and charm his way out ... "was not obtained in violation of .\firanda). Note that 
the nature of the statement made to the suspect will be of critical importance in 
determining whether it constitutes interrogation. See notes 101 & 102 supra. 
1°5Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 
106See United States v. Pauldino, 487 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1973) (polic£' request for 
bill of sale for vehicle was proper after arrested suspect volunteered the stat£'· 
ment that he had a bill of sale for the vehicle); United States v. Vogel, 18 C.~LA. 
160, 39 C.M.R. 160 (1968). Whether questions are sufficiently n£'utral or have b£'-
come improper interrogation must be determined from the individual facts of each 
case. State v. Taylor, 343 A.2d 11 (Me. 1975) (policeman's question, "What do you 
mean?'' held to be a neutral question following defendant's initiated statement, 
and reply was not in violation of Miranda); Commonwealth v. Yount, __ Pa. _, 
314 A.2d 242 (1974) (defendant entered police station and announced that the 
police were looking for him; police questioning to determine why, and sub· 
sequently who had been his homicide victim, was proper). 
107 Miranda resolves the conflict by defining volunteered statements as those 
made "voluntarily without any compelling influences." 384 U.S. at 478. Query. 
whether this statement applies to a volunteered admission made after station 
house detention? 
108See note 17 supra. 
1°9384 U.S. at 477-78. 
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have envisaged a general investigation which lacked an identifiable 
suspect. The numerous cases in this area seem to break down into 
three major groups: those in which a known suspect did not exist at 
the time of questioning (e.g., the investigation had not yet "fo-
cused" on the individual questioned or perhaps a violation of law 
was not yet clear);110 those in which a suspect may have been 
known, but custody was lacking;111 and those in which both a sus-
pect and custody existed but police questioning was held to have 
been general investigation and not within the Miranda definition of 
interrogation. 112 
While there is some reason to doubt the propriety of the last-
mentioned group of cases, the Supreme Court has in the years since 
Miranda evinced a hostility both to the case itself and to its applica-
tion outside the station house. 113 Accordingly, this limit on 
Miranda's scope may not be appropriate despite some question as to 
Miranda's original meaning. 
Similar to this last group of cases are the cases in which a suspect 
has been surprised in the commission of an offense by the police and 
is questioned, usually after he is taken into custody. A number of 
courts have approved questioning without warnings in such a situa-
tion, reasoning that Miranda was never meant to apply to on-the-
scene questioning. Presumably the courts involved believe that the 
coercive atmosphere of the station house is lacking in such circum-
110See District of Columbia v. M.E.H., 312 A.2d 561 (D.C. App. 1973) (question of 
who owned the gun was addressed to the group, not to a given person); State v. 
Egger, 24 Ore. App. 927, 547 P.2d 643 (1976) (vehicle stop for erratic driving). 
But see People v. Norwood,_ Mich. App. _, 243 N.W.2d 719 (1976) (holding 
that sheriffs question, "What Happened?" to defendant who had summoned him 
to her home because she had shot the deceased was a violation of Miranda); cf. 
People v. Greer, 49 App. Div. 297, 374 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1975). Some courts have 
held Miranda inapplicable to stopping and frisking under much the same reason-
ing. See People v. Myles,_ Cal. App. 3d_, 123 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975); Crum v. 
State, 281 So.2d 368 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973). See also note 100 supra. 
111 See State v. Shepardson, 194 Neb. 643, _, 235 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1975) (ve-
hicle registration check led to officer's noting marihuana seeds; questioning prior 
to formal arrest didn't require warnings); cf. Gedicks v. State, 62 Wis. 74, 214 
N. W.2d 569 (1974) (defendant's I. D. checked by policeman to determine his reason 
to be on university grounds). 
112See Owens v. United States, 340 A.2d 821 (D.C. App. 1975) (burglar was 
caught at the scene and handcuffed; his incriminating reply (made one or two sec-
onds after the apprehension) to policeman's question of what he was doing on the 
roof was admissible as warnings were not required); State v. Henson, ___ Ore. 
App. _, 541 P.2d 1085 (1975) (vehicle stop resulted in questioning about a hit 
and run; Miranda warnings held not to have been required despite fact that offi-
cer removed defendant's car keys and directed him to remain in the vehicle). 
113See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973). 
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stances.U4 Additionally, a number of decisions have mentioned the 
possibility that the suspect is in fact innocent and simply found in 
incriminating circumstances which can be cleared up quickly 
through limited police questioning. The propriety of such reasoning 
is questionable considering Mimnda's intent. 
There is general agreement that law enforcement officers may ask 
questions of suspects without Miranda warnings when the ques-
tions are motivated by safety considerations. 115 "While life hangs in 
the balance, there is no room to require admonitions concerning the 
right to counsel and to remain silent. It is inconceivable that the 
Miranda court or the framers of the Constitution envisioned such 
admonishments first be given under [the urgent circumstances in-
volved]." 116 While presumably the suspects in these cases retain 
their right to remain silent, the cases suggest that safety overcomes 
the Miranda rationale which dealt with a lesser priority. 
A large number of courts have held that traffic offenses constitute 
an exception to Miranda. 117 Generally, such stops will be noncusto-
dial in any event. However, the rationale for excluding traffic stops 
seems to be that they are common events that are to be expected by 
most citizens; that the usual traffic violation is not the sort of crime 
Miranda dealt with; and that traffic questioning fits the general in-
vestigatory exception to Mimnda. 118 While this may be appropriate 
for simple driving violations, the same rule has occasionally been 
applied to drunken driving and more serious offenses. 119 These 
cases tend to blend into those which hold that Miranda is inappli-
cable to misdemeanors. 120 In view of the substantial punishments 
114See United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1973). 
115See United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) lt!n band <FBI 
agent participating in a gambling raid asked the defendant whetht?r he had any 
weapons; the resulting seizure of illegal weapons was not in violation of .\limmlu J; 
Norman v. State, 302 So.2d 254, 258 <Miss. 1974) (questions to group which had 
fired at the police were motivated by safety and were not inqui:;itorial intt!rroga· 
tion). 
116People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 2d 875, 882, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (19741. 
117See Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant questiont!d aftt?r 
arrest for drunken driving during which he threatened police officers with a gun; 
Miranda held inapplicable); State v. Bowen, 336 A.2d 228 !Del. Supl'r. 197:>J 
(Miranda held inapplicable to motor vehicle cases); State \'. C'upp, 3G Ohio App. 
2d 224, 304 N.E.2d 598 (1973) (Miranda inapplicable to questions accompanying 
arrest for drunken driving). But see State v. Lawson, 285 N.C.2d 320, 204 S.E.2d 
843 (1974) (Miranda held applicable to traffic violations). 
118Cf. J. ZAGEL, supra note 72 at 34-35. 
119See note 117 supra. 
120See State v. Glanton, _Iowa_, 231 N. W.2d 31 (1974); State v. Gabrielson, 
_Iowa-· 192 N. W.2d 792 (1971); State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 
826 (1969). 
137 
HeinOnline  -- 78 Mil. L. Rev. 138 1977
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78 
for such offenses, one must question the legitimacy of limiting 
Miranda in such a fashion. If Miranda itself is correctly decided, 
how can a court accept improperly obtained statements just because 
the maximum sentence involved will be "no more" than a year in 
jail? 
Any arrest requires a formal processing of the defendant, usually 
known as "booking." Whether through formal booking or other ad-
ministrative questioning, information is occasionally obtained which 
is incriminating and which proves harmful to the accused at trial. 121 
Four of five federal circuit courts of appeal that had considered the 
issue by the close of 1976 had held Miranda inapplicable to prelimi-
nary or administrative questions. 122 The rationale involved appears 
to be that the data is normally nonincriminating, is essential to an 
efficient criminal justice process, and constitutes noninvestigative 
questioning. 
As suggested by one commentator, 123 there is limited Supreme 
Court authority to support this view. In California v. Bye1·s, 124 the 
Court upheld a state reporting system which required drivers in-
volved in accidents to stop and leave names and addresses. Clearly 
the Court found a limited infringement on the driver's privilege 
against self-incrimination to be appropriate. 125 The same reasoning 
121 See United States eJ.' rei. Hines v. LaVelle, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975) (in-
formation gained through informal police administrative questioning while de-
fendant was being transported to the station house proved important in identify-
ing suspect as rapist). 
122The Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
held such questioning to be proper without warnings while the District of Colum-
bia Circuit has allowed questioning but rejected its results from use in evidence nt 
trial. Note, The Applicability of Miranda to the Police Booking Process, 1976 
DUKE L.J. 574, 576 (1976), and cases cited therein. 
123 I d. at 585-86. 
124402 u.s. 424 (1971). 
125 In California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court considered California's 
hit and run statute which required the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident 
to stop at the scene and to leave his name and address. Byers claimed that his 
conviction for failure to do so after an accident violated his privilege against self-
incrimination. Reversing the Supreme Court of California, the Court upheld the 
state statute, finding that it did not involve "a highly selective group inhl'rently 
suspect of criminal activities," and did not apply only in an area "permeated with 
criminal statutes." ld. at 430. Leaving name and address was found to be an es-
sentially neutral act even though it might supply a link in the evidentiary chnin. 
!d. at 434. 
While the majority opinion, consisting of a plurality and a concurrence in the 
judgment by Mr. Justice Harlan, found that the privilege was inapplicable, the 
dissent stated that, contrary to the Court's holding, the driver of a vehicle in-
volved in an accident was so likely to have violated a criminal statute thnt thl' 
Court's holding could not in truth be distinguished from its previous cases. This 
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may be applicable here. On the other hand, Bye1·s dealt with a situ-
ation believed to be inherently noncriminal. While the preliminary 
information supplied during the booking process should normally be 
nonincriminating, it is part and parcel of the criminal justice process 
and is like either to yield incriminating information directly, or to 
supply leads to the prosecution. It may be that the proper com-
promise is to allow the questioning but to immunize the defendant 
from any use of the information gained through it. 
The Supreme Court has expressly held Miranda inapplicable to 
grand jury proceedings in United States t'. Mandu}ano. 126 The 
Court stated that Miranda's concern was with custodial interroga-
tion and "simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial in-
terrogation as equivalents." 127 The Court also stated that the right 
against self-incrimination at a grand jury was somewhat more lim-
ited for a witness than the privilege available to an accused being 
questioned by the police, that no right to counsel existed at grand 
juries, and that accordingly the Mimnda warnings would be inap-
propriate.128 By implication, general custom, and in the military by 
appears in part to be true. However, in Byers, the act of reporting was not lleces-
sarily incriminating, while prior reporting requirements that were overturned 
were almost equivalent to conviction. The Court actually utilized a balancing test, 
attempting to balance the rights of the individual with thl' rights of society, i.e., 
Tension between the State's demands for disclosures and the prote<UQn of th~ rl~:ht ogaln.>t 
self·incrimination is likely to give ris(> to st>rious questions. lnP\'itnbly tht'Stt mUISt b<(t r't'roh·~:d 
in terms of balancing the publio need on the one hand, and the lndi\•hlu>l claim tu ~MUlUU•mal 
proteotions on the other .... 
Note also the Court's approach in fourth amendment cases, e.g., California Bank-
ers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). It seems clear that in the case of reporting 
requirements, the individual's rights have been limited and that, so long as a 
proper purpose is involved and the result of the report is not inherently in-
criminating, the requirement will be upheld. As Byers indicates, the probability 
of incrimination is relevant. The Government may not avoid the problem by using 
forfeiture proceedings rather than a criminal prosecution, United States v. U.S. 
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971), although civil tax proceedings are 
possible. But compare Widdis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 1015 <D. Alas. 1974), 
with Jensen v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 116 (Colo. 1972). The alternati\'e is 
to find that the privilege is applicable but that, to sustain the reporting require-
ment, neither the information divulged nor derivative information can be used as a 
prosecution. The Court in Byers rejected this alternative, finding that it would 
place an insurmountable burden on the prosecution. Following Mr. Justice Har-
lan's dissent in Byers, the Virginia Supreme Court has sustained a state reporting 
requirement, despite a real threat of self-incrimination, because of an overriding 
state interest. Banks v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 527, 230 S.E.2d 256 (1976). 
126 425 U.S. 564 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Columbia Im·estment Corp., 
457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289 (1974). 
127 425 U.S. at 579. 
128 I d. at 579-80. 
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statutory design, 129 there is no necessity for a trial judge to stop a 
witness at trial who may incriminate himself and to warn him of his 
right to remain silent. It is important to note that although there is 
no legal duty to warn a witness of his right against self-
incrimination at a grand jury proceeding or trial, warnings may be 
given. 130 
By its very nature Miranda was intended to deal with criminal 
interrogations. Its purpose was to give meaning to the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. By definition, an administra-
tive consequence cannot be criminal. Accordingly, interrogations 
which cannot result in criminal prosecutions are not interrogations 
within the scope of Miranda. The dividing line between criminal 
and adminstrative consequence is thin at times, 131 and it can be dif-
ficult in the absence of judicial decision to predict Miranda's 
applicability. 
129 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.) para. 
140a(2), stating that a judge need not warn a witness at trial of his right to remain 
silent but that he may do so. 
130 See United States v. Jacobs, No. 75-1319 (2d Cir. filed Dec. 30, 1976), sup-
pressing the grand jury testimony of a perjury defendant for failure to warn her 
during the proceedings that she was a "target" of the investigation. In reaching 
its decision, the court exercised its supervisory powers while concurring in the 
Supreme Court's decision in Mandujano. The Court noted that it had been the 
practice within its circuit for twenty years for United States Attorneys to warn 
putative defendants of their status; the failure of a strike force prosecutor in the 
circuit to do so resulted, in the court's opinion, in unequal protection of the law 
and required suppression to enforce conformity within the circuit. Despite Jacobs, 
the Supreme Court has held, as a matter of constitutional law, that even putative 
defendants need not be warned of their right to remain silent. United States v. 
Wong, 45 U.S.L.W. 4464 (U.S. 1977) (No.74-635). The Court's decision may ulti-
mately prove of little consequence as increasing support appears to exist for legis-
lation that would grant witnesses the right to counsel when appearing before a 
grand jury. See ABA SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 
(Winter 1977). 
131 Incrimination may refer to a consequence of an act (such as a criminal convic-
tion), or to an act (a testimonial utterance) leading to a consequence. 
The clearest form of incrimination is a judicially imposed criminal conviction. 
The extent to which consequences other than a criminal conviction may consti-
tute incrimination is unclear. In the past the Supreme Court has tended to look at 
the actual consequence of a proceeding and its intent, rather than at its label, to 
define incrimination. Thus, juvenile proceedings were generally found to be "crim-
inal." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). However, the Court may be retreating. 
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court allowed prison officials 
to draw an inference of guilt from the silence of Palmigiano in a prison discipline 
proceeding. As the Court found that the State of Rhode Island had not attempted 
to make use of his silence at a criminal proceeding distinct from the disciplinary 
proceeding, it found that the adverse inference was justifiable. Since Palmigiano 
was "sentenced" to thirty days in punitive segregation and a downgrading in clas-
sification, somewhat obviously the Court found the consequence of restricted lib-
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This has been particularly true with Internal Revenue Service in-
vestigations. The transition between administrative tax investiga-
tion and criminal tax evasion investigation is difficult to pinpoint, 
despite the IRS use of intelligence division agents for tax evasion 
erty not to be the equivalent of "incrimination." The Court appears to be looking 
at the social purpose served by the proceeding rather than either its label or con· 
sequence. Thus, a form of increased deprivation of liberty becomes noncriminal. 
The case is more than a little surprising because at the time of his hearing Pal· 
migiano had not been granted immunity and could have been prosecuted. Pal· 
migiano's offense was "inciting a disturbance and disruption of prison operations, 
which might have resulted in a riot." 425 U.S. at 312. Thus the possibility of later 
proceedings would seem to have been real and substantial. Despite this the Court 
simply found that proceedings had not in fact taken place, making the case a 
strange and perhaps important anomaly, for in the past the question had been one 
of possibility and not of hindsight. The Court did note that Palmigiano's silence 
was only one piece of evidence considered at the hearing, implying that a disposi-
tion based only on his silence might be improper. 
In a case even more disturbing than Ba:rter v. Palmigia!lo, the Supreme Court 
found military summary courts-martial, which can impose a sentence of thirty 
days confinement at hard labor, to be similar to parole revocation hearings and not 
criminal convictions requiring counsel for the accused. Middendorf''· Henry, 425 
U.S. 25 (1976). Clearly the Court is not troubling itself over a mere deprivation of 
liberty. Were it not for the provh::ions of the UNIFORM CODE OF :'lliLITARY JUS· 
TICE, 10 U.S.C. § 831, it would seem likely that the Court would also have I"{'· 
moved the right against self-incrimination from service personnel receiving sum· 
mary courts-martial. 
While civil liability per se does not constitute incrimination, a ch·il penalty hav-
ing a punitive intent may. See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2256-57 
(McNaughton ed., 1961). There is an historic precedent for equating some civil 
actions with criminal sanctions. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 
(1885), holding that: 
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by th~ oornml<~lon of arr~no~• 
against the law, are of this quasi~riminal nature, we tlunk that th•y ""' within tl:.~ n.awn . 
of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no pt>n;on •hall bto oompt>lll'd In an; 
criminal ease to be a witness against himself .... 
(in rem action). 
Distinguishing between penalties that are quasi-criminal in natur{' is difficult. 
See People v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 421, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812, 525 P.2d 716 
(1974), finding that authorization to award exemplary damages in a civil action 
does not expose the defendant to criminal sanctions against which he is protected 
by the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Deportation is not equivalent to incrimination. See Woodby ''· Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 
(1960); Chavez-Raya v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 519 F.2d 397 (7th 
Cir. 1975). 
Loss of livelihood generally does not appear to be a relevant consequence al· 
though disbarment may. Cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 0968) (policeman 
may be dismissed if he fails to answer specific questions narrowly directed to· 
wards his duties and despite failure to grant immunity). Brtt see ex rei. Vining\'. 
Florida REC, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973), finding that deprivation of livelihood may 
be penal in nature, and that, where license revocation or suspension is the possible 
result, compelling of testimony is a violation of the self-incrimination clauses of 
the United States and Florida constitutions. 
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cases. The Supreme Court has refused to apply Miranda to noncus-
todial tax investigations. 132 
While most tax investigations are noncustodial, the same is not 
true of deportatjon proceedings. However, as deportion is viewed as 
a noncriminal consequence, Miranda does not apply to deportation 
iJ}terrogations. 133 Investigations which are primarily administrative 
may not require warnings despite the possibility of later criminal 
prosecution. 134 As prison discipline proceedings have been deter-
Disbarment has proven vexatious. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the 
Supreme Court reversed Spevack's disbarment for invoking the privilege when he 
was subpoenaed to produce financial records. While there is authority for believ-
ing that disbarment is quasi-criminal in nature despite its public service function, 
see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968), most states have continued to trent it 
as civil in nature. See Segretti v. State Bar of California, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 126 Cal. 
Rptr. 793, 544 P.2d 929 (1976) ("the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against 
attorneys is not to punish but rather to protect the court and public from the 
official ministrations of persons unfit to practice." 544 P.2d at 933); Maryland 
State Bar Ass'n v. Sugerman, 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974). See generally Note, 
Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 72 MICH. L. REV. 84 (1973); Chilingirian, State Disbarment Proceedi11gs 
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 489 (1969). 
Far more difficult to resolve than even the complex issues mentioned above Is 
"treatment." Prior to In re Gault, it was believed that juveniles were unable to 
assert the right against self-incrimination because their proceedings were benefi-
cial in nature and designed for corrective purposes rather than for punishment. 
Thus they were "non-criminal." While Gault has bestowed the privilege on 
juvenile proceedings, the rationale of beneficial "treatment" remains. Thus in one 
case a student suspected of smoking in violation of school rules was held not enti-
tled to Miranda warnings because "the purpose of most school-house rules is to 
find facts ... relating to special maladjustments of the child with a view toward 
correcting it [sic]." Doe v. New Mexico, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. Rev. 
489 (1975); dissent is at 542 P.2d 834 (1975). As the student was interrogated for 
forty minutes and ultimately confessed to smoking marihuana, the case seems far 
from a simple violation of school rules. 
The same theory is used to justify denying the privilege to those who will be 
committed to mental institutions rather than prisons. See Williams v. Director, 
Patuxent Institution, 276 Md. 272, 347 A.2d 179, cert. denied,_ U.S._ (1975) 
(defective delinquent treatment is not criminal in nature); Aronson, Should the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examina-
tions?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1973). 
It would seem clear that the dividing line between a punitive consequence and 
legitimate treatment is rather fine. So too is the line between criminal conviction 
and state initiated loss of livelihood. While it seems unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will expand the definition of "incrimination" in the future, it and the state 
courts will presumably have to draw a more understandable line between those 
consequences which are incriminating and those which are not. 
132 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
133 See Chen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 537 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 
1976). 
134 Cf. United States v. Harris, 381 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (officer at air-
port checkpoint did not have to warn suspect of his rights after being warned that 
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mined to be administrative in nature, 135 Mimnda warnings appear 
to be unnecessary in the course of such proceedings. 136 
VIII. WARNING SUSPECTS 
Miranda does not require any specific method of warning a sus-
pect, and the actual method used by law enforcement agents varies 
by jurisdiction and individual agent. Perhaps the most common 
method is the oral warning in which the police warn their suspects 
of their rights orally either from memory or by reading from a 
rights warning card of one type or another. 137 
Because oral warnings are susceptible both to error and to sub-
sequent litigation at trial, many police use previously prepared 
warning forms in lieu of 138 or in conjunction with oral warnings. 139 
Normally a suspect will be handed such a form, told to read it, and 
asked to acknowledge in writing receipt of his rights warnings. 
Frequently, the warning portions of the form will be combined with 
a waiver portion which will provide space for a suspect to either 
exercise his rights or to waive them. Use of written waiver forms 
tends to moot many of the usual errors that may accompany oral 
warnings if only because the form itself is admissible in evidence at 
trial while the officer who gives oral warnings is subject to crm;s-
examination as to their content. 
Written warnings and waiver certificates are not, of course, con-
clusive on the issue of Miranda compliance, for the suspect may 
misunderstand the written notice, feel compelled by the circum-
stances of the situation, or be motivated to waive his rights by other 
information given by the interrogating officers. 140 However, the 
the suspect had a gun inside his bag). See generally cases cited at notes 109-114 
supra and accompanying text. 
135 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). 
136 I d. at 315. 
137 Warning cards are in widespread use. See State v. Attebery, 110 Ariz. 354, 
519 P.2d 53 (1974) (defendant was asked to read the card, then the police officer 
read to the defendant, and then the defendant signed the card after answering the 
officer's questions relating to his rights); Breedlove v. State, 516 P.2d 553 (1973) 
(officer read the card to the suspect and then asked him if he understood each of 
the rights). 
138 Written explanation of rights will be sufficient if the suspect can read and un-
derstand them. They need not be supplemented by oral explanation. See State v. 
McNeal,_ La. -· _ So.2d _ (1976) (18 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2524 (Feb. 23, 
1976)). 
139 Use of written explanation forms may moot errors made in previous oral warn-
ings. See People v. Perry, 52 App. Div. 963, _, 382 N. Y.S.2d 845, 846-t7l1976). 
140 When the warning form has a waiver portion it is not unknown for unscrupul-
ous police officers to tell suspects that signing the waiver portion of the form 
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written format does place the prosecution in a better tactical posi-
tion than does an oral warning. 
IX. WAIVING THE MIRANDA RIGHTS 
A. THE WAIVER FRAMEWORK 
A suspect may not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless 
he waives his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. To be 
effective the waiver must be "made voluntarily, knowingly and in-
telligently." 141 Thus, in the absence of a "spontaneous" statement 
volunteered by the suspect, the burden is on the police to obtain a 
valid Miranda waiver before interrogation may take place. 142 In 
the words of Miranda: 
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and 
a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or 
appointed counsel .... An express statement that the individual i11 
willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed 
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver 
will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after 
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in 
fact eventually obtained.143 
It is apparent that there is no need for a suspect to exercise affirma-
tively his right to remain silent. 144 Rather, he must waive his 
privilege in order to make a statement. The right to counsel must, 
however, be affirmatively exercised. 145 Unless limited to future 
means only that the suspect has been warned of his rights. In such a case as a 
practical matter the defense must attempt to persuade the court of the accuracy of 
the defense story, in order to overcome the apparent voluntary defense waiver. 
141 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). However, full knowledge of the 
true circumstances surrounding the suspect's predictament is not required. 
142 If Miranda is violated, the resulting statement will be excluded from evi· 
dence. 
143 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (emphasis added and citations 
omitted). 
144 While the suspect need not affirmatively exercise his right to remain silent, 
there are numerous cases attempting to determine whether a suspect has in fact 
exercised his privilege to remain silent, in whole or in part. See United States v. 
Marchildon, 519 F .2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant's response to police re-
quest to inform meant only that suspect wouldn't talk about his sources of supply, 
not that he wished to remain silent). As suspects are wont to make comments 
when asked if they wish to make a statement, the courts are faced with an endless 
variety of factual settings which must be individually analyzed to determine 
whether the suspect was attempting to stop the interrogation. 
145 While a suspect who does not waive his rights to counsel must be given a 
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consultation 146 or to some specific limited use, 147 in the absence of 
the suspect's express permission to allow it to continue, a request 
for a lawyer will stop interrogation completely. 148 
The ideal form of waiver would consist of a proper rights warning 
followed by three questions: "Do you understand your rights? Do 
you want a lawyer? Do you wish to make a statement?" 149 An an-
swer of yes to the first and third questions and a negative to the 
second create a proper waiver. However, such an express waiver is 
rare. Most cases dealt with in the courts 150 appear to involve al-
leged waivers in which either the suspect stated that he understood 
his rights and then proceeded to answer police questions, 151 or went 
immediately from the warnings to the interrogation. 152 Faced with 
this situation the courts have generally accepted implied waivers 153 
when convinced of their existence. Of course, in doing so the courts 
must weigh all of the surrounding circumstances, for the waiver 
must be voluntary. 
It is important to distinguish between cases in which the suspect 
spontaneously began making a statement after receiving warn-
lawyer before an interrogation may take place, Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 
470-71 (1966), in the absence of interrogation, counsel need not automatically be 
supplied, and the suspect desiring counsel is well advised to affirmatively request 
one. 
146 See People v. Tunage, 45 Cal. App. 3d 201, 119 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975). 
147 See People v. Madison, 56 Ill. 2d 476, 309 N.E.2d 11 (1974) <defendant's state-
ment that he would give a statement but not sign it until a public defender was 
present held not to prevent interrogation as it was not a request for counsel). 
148 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). See State v. Nicholson, 19 
Ore. App. 226, 232, 527 P.2d 140, 142 (1974), eoulra People v. Madison, 56 Ill. 2d 
476, 309 N.E.2d 11 (1974). The court held that a defendant's refusal to sign his 
statement until he had a lawyer present was a general request for counsel which 
should have stopped the interrogation immediately. 
149 This form of express waiver is in use in the Army, for example. See Dep't of 
the Army Form 3881, Rights Warning/Waiver Certificate. Note that a defective 
warning will usually render any waiver a nullity. 
150 It must be remembered that perfect waivers are seldom litigated. Thus, it can 
be presumed that numerous express waivers are obtained by police, but that those 
cases involving implied waiver are apt to be challenged. 
151 See People v. Johnson, 13 Ill. App. 2d 1020, 1025, 304 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1973). 
152 See State v. Pineda, 110 Ariz. 342, 519 P.2d 41 (1974). 
153 See United States v. Moreno-Lopez, 466 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Gochenour, 47 C.M.R. 979 (A.F.C.lll.R. 1973); Commonwealth v. Val-
liere,_ Mass. _, _, 321 N.E.2d 625, 631 (1974); Braziel v. State, ___ Tenn. 
App. _, 529 S.W.2d 501 (Crim. App.), eert. denied, ___ Tenn. __ , 529 S.W.2d 
501 (1975); Moreno v. State, 511 S. W.2d 273, 276-77 <Tex. 1974); State \'. Brez-
nick, _ Vt. _, _, 356 A.2d 540, 542 (1976). But see Bauer\', State, ___ Ind. 
App. 2d _, 300 N.E.2d 364 (1974) (printed waiver form insufficient in absence of 
"interrogative assurances" that the suspect understood his rights); State v. Har-
ris, 24 N.C. App. 412, 219 S.E.2d 266 (1975) (explicit waiver required). See also, 
J. ZAGEL, supra note 72, at 61-63. 
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ings 154 and those in which he began answering questions after re-
ceiving warnings. In the first situation, the statement is voluntary 
and spontaneous and waiver is virtually automatic; in the second, 
waiver must be found from the circumstances. Presence of the sus-
pect's attorney at the interrogation is persuasive, if not absolute 
proof, of waiver and will usually serve to do away with the need for 
either waiver and/or warnings. 155 
A recurring problem is that of the suspect who refuses to sign a 
written waiver. The courts have consistently held that the mere re-
fusal to sign such a waiver does not make a subsequent statement 
involuntary. 156 On the other hand, it may be strong evidence of the 
suspect's desire not to waive his rights and may consequently result 
in a finding of nonwaiver. 157 A related problem is the suspect who 
makes an oral statement but refuses to make a written one. While 
such a refusal may mean only that the suspect has gotten "cold 
feet," it may also indicate a mistaken belief that Miranda bars oral 
statements from use in court but not written ones. In such a case, 
the oral statement will be inadmissible 158 because of a basic misun-
derstanding of the Miranda rights. 
B. KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER 
A valid Miranda waiver presupposes that the suspect involved is 
aware of and understands his Miranda rights. A defect in the warn-
ings may thus make waiver impossible. 159 Just as the warnings 
154 Errors in warnings can frequently be cured by spontaneous statements from 
the suspect, for it is a rare case in which such a statement is found to have been an 
improper product of coercive circumstances. 
155 See White v. State, 294 Ala. 265, 314 So.2d 857 (1975). See generally J. ZAGEL, 
supra note 72, at 58-59. While warnings in such a case may be unnecessary, as 
Mr. Zagel suggests, they are well advised to moot future claims of error. 
156 See United States v. Sawyer, 504 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Cooper, 499 F.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Reynolds, 496 F.2d 
158 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1970); 
Hewitt v. State, 261 Ind. 71, 300 N.E.2d 94 (1973); State v. Jones, 35 Ohio App. 
2d 84, 300 N.E.2d 230 (1973); Commonwealth v. Cost, _ Pa. Super. __ , 362 
A.2d 1027 (1976). 
157 See Millican v. State,_ Ind. App. 2d _, 300 N.E.2d 359 (1973). 
158 See State v. Jones, 37 Ohio St. 2d 21, 306 N.E.2d 409 (1974) (suspect made an 
oral statement but refused to continue while police took written notes). 
159 Miranda expressly rejects the possibility that warnings may be omitted be-
cause the suspect may have prior knowledge of his rights. "[w]hatever the back-
ground of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of interrogation is indis-
pensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is 
free to exercise his privileges at that point in time." 384 U.S. 436, •168-69 (1966). 
Note that the suspect who persistently interferes with a police attempt to warn 
him of his rights by claiming prior knowledge may be held to his statement if the 
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must be properly communicated, 160 so too must the suspect com-
prehend them and the effects of waiver. Should the suspect lack the 
ability to understand the rights or to make an intelligent 161 waiver 
decision, a waiver '"ill be void. Thus, in any given case, questions 
relating to the suspect's intelligence, physical and mental condi-
tion, 162 and the circumstances surrounding the waiver will be highly 
relevant. 163 To a large extent the determination of the voluntari-
ness of the waiver subsumes the traditional common law determina-
tion of the voluntariness of a confession. Miranda explicitly bars 
the use of threats, trickery, and cajolery to obtain waivers164 al-
though trickery that does not overbear the will of the suspect may 
be acceptable after a valid waiver. 
C. STATE AND MILITARY RESTRICTIONS 
ON WAIVER 
Many of the states have formulated their own statutory or 
judge-made restrictions on waiver of the Miranda rights. Perhaps 
the most interesting rule can be found in New York, which has 
police stop and proceed to obtain a waiver. See United States v. Sikorski, 21 
C.M.A. 345,45 C.M.R. 119 (1972); State v. Thomas, __ Wash. App. ---· ---· 553 
P.2d 1357, 1363 (1976). 
160 The warnings must, for example, be given in a language that the suspect un-
derstands. Cf. People v. Gonzales, 22 Ill. App. 2d 83, 316 N.E.2d 800 I 1974). 
Another difficulty may be the rapid "ritualistic" fashion that the police :;ometimes 
use to give warnings, see People v. Andino, 80 Misc. 2d 155, 362 N. Y .S.2d 766, 
770-71 (1974). 
161 See Greenwell v. State,_ Md. _, __ , 363 A.2d 555, 561 U976) <minimum 
ability to understand must be found). 
162 See Commonwealth v. Hosey, _ Mass. -· __ , 334 N.E.2d 44, 48 (}975) 
(emotional upset complicated by gratuitous police information that it would bt' 
difficult to get a lawyer voided the waiver). Poor physical or mental condition does 
not necessarily make waiver impossible. See United States v. Choice, 392 F. 
Supp. 460, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("This District, however, has rejected a per Sl' rule 
that a serious gunshot wound must be presumed to leave its victim incapable of 
exercising free volition and making rational choices " (citations omitted)); People 
v. Barrow, _ Cal. App. 3d _, _, 131 Cal. Rptr. 913, 918 (1976) (waiver sus-
tained despite evidence of alcohol use and emotional upset); McKittrick \', State, 
541 S. W.2d 177 (Tex. 1976) (narcotics addict). 
163 Any form of threat or inducement may make the waiver a nullity, just as the 
same conduct may make a confession involuntary. Note People \'. Andino, __ _ 
Misc. 2d 155, 362 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770-71 (1974) (determination that uncounseled 
drug defendant may not waive Miranda rights when waiver may be induced by 
what amounted to plea bargaining in view of the unusually severe sentencing con-
sequences of New York drug laws in the absence of plea bargaining) . • \lirarzda 
states that "lengthy interrogation or incommunicado interrogation before a state-
ment is made is strong evidence of an invalid waiver." 384 U.S. at 476. 
164 384 U.S. at 476. 
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held 165 that a suspect who has obtained counsel cannot waive his 
right to counsel at an interrogation unless an affirmative waiver is 
made in the presence of the attorney. Somewhat obviously the New 
York rule tends to prevent lawyerless interrogations after counsel 
has entered the scene. Such a rule prevents law enforcement agents 
from nullifying the right to counsel. 166 A counterpart is found in 
military law. 
A number of states have created special restrictions on obtaining 
statements from juveniles, often requiring the presence of family 
members or an attorney before the Miranda rights can be 
waived. 167 Because of the diversity of state rules, statutes, and in-
terpretations, it is essential in any state case to scrutinize state law 
carefully when determining what is necessary for a valid waiver. 168 
D. SHOWING WAIVER AT TRIAL 
Prior to Miranda the primary issue surrounding a confession or 
admission was the voluntariness of the statement offered in evi-
dence. While this voluntariness doctrine remains, Miranda has had 
the pragmatic effect of merging the traditional voluntariness in-
quiry into the Miranda waiver determination. As the waiver ques-
tion takes into account all of the questions that usually surround the 
voluntariness inquiry, a finding of a valid waiver normally dictates a 
finding that the statement itself was made voluntarily. Con-
sequently, the issue to be litigated is the validity of the Miranda 
waiver. The procedures and burdens that usually accompany the 
traditional voluntariness inquiry normally apply to the Miranda 
waiver inquiry. 169 
165 People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 
666 (1968). 
166 Interestingly, the Court of Military Appeals has held that interrogations of 
military personnel who have obtained counsel cannot take place unless counsel has 
been previously notified and given an opportunity to attend the interrogation. 
United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976). McOmber was 
the product of a number of cases in which military interrogators obtained state-
ments, after proper warnings and waivers, from defendants in the absence of their 
defense counsel. 
167 See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972) (child's parents or 
guardians must be informed of the Miranda rights and child must be allowed to 
consult with parents or guardians or attorney before waiver can take place); In rc 
F.G., 511 S.W.2d 370, 373-74 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974) (Texas Family Code held 
to require attorney's concurrence before juvenile can waive privilege against self-
incrimination). See also Hall v. State,_ Ind. _, 346 N.E.2d 584 (1976). 
168 See Hogan v. State, 330 So. 2d 557 (Fla. App. 1976) (state statute, Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.111(d) (4), required written waiver of counsel in the presence of two 
attesting witnesses; failure to so waive held nonprejudicial, however). 
169 See generally Lederer, The Law of Confessions-The Voluntariness Doctrine, 
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Once the issue is raised, the burden is on the government to 
prove, usually by a preponderance of the evidence,l70 that appli-
cable rights warnings were given and that a valid waiver was ob-
tained. Normally, this is done via testimony of the officer who gave 
the warnings and obtained the waiver, or of a witness to the event, 
although a written warning and waiver form may be used. Some 
courts will allow a police officer to testify that he read the warnings 
from a standard card that he carried, rather than requiring that he 
testify to the specific warnings from memory. 171 Others will reject 
such a procedure in the absence of the doctrine of past recollection 
recorded. The mere statement, "I read his rights to him," is 
insufficient. 172 
A written rights waiver certificate is admissible when the proper 
foundation is laid. 173 The defense will usually attempt to show an 
incomplete or confusing warning and either nonwaiver or a misun-
derstood waiver by the defendant. Because much of the usual litiga-
tion surrounding a waiver concerns what actually happened, 
interrogators are well advised to record their session on tape or 
videotape. 174 Similarly, when doubt exists as to what actually oc-
curred, a defense counsel should, where local procedure permits, 
request that the judge make special findings as to the actual facts 
surrounding the warnings and alleged waiver. 175 
74 MIL. L. REV. 67, 88 (1976), for a discussion of the specific procedural rules and 
burdens of proof in this area. 
170 Miranda requires that a statement taken without counsel places a "heavy bur· 
den" on the government to demonstrate a knowing intelligent wah•er. 384 U.S. at 
475. This has been interpreted to mean a preponderance. Cf. Lego \'. Twomey, 
404 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1972). See Hart. v. State, 137 Ga. App. 644, 645, 224 S.E.2d 
755, 756 (1976). A number of states may require higher burdens. 
171 See Lewis v. State, 296 So. 2d 575 (Fla. App. 1974). Note that testimony as to 
the specific warnings should not violate the hearsay rule as the statement is not 
offered for the truth of its contents, but rather to establish that warnings were 
given. See State v. McClain, 220 Kan. 80, 551 P.2d 806 (1976). 
172 Cf. State v. Welch,_ La._, 337 So. 2d 1114 (1976) (witness testified that 
officer had not advised defendant of his right to counsel). 
173 When the written waiver is the sole waiver in the case, the best e\·idence rule 
may be applicable. Cf. Sanders v. State, _ Ind. __ , 348 N.E.2d 642 11976) <is· 
sue not raised as no motion to suppress the confession was ever made). 
174 See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F .2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972); People\'. Gonzales, 22 
Ill. App. 3d 83, 316 N.E.2d 800 (1974) (videotaped interrogation showed voluntary 
waiver). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4 
(1975). Note that use of tape recordings will require special efforts to authenticate 
the evidence. 
175 Cf. United States v. Johnson, 529 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1976) C'iti1zg Evans \'. 
United States, 375 F .2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), for the proposition that a federal trial 
court should make specific findings on the record with regard to .\liranda warn· 
ings and waiver. (Failure to do so is not necessarily reversible error.) Compare 
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X. NOTICE TO COUNSEL OF INTERROGATIONS 
Law enforcement agents have frequently questioned suspects 
known to have had counsel. When, as is often the case, the suspects 
in question waive their Mimnda rights and make statements in the 
absence of their attorneys, the defense counsel have little alterna-
tive other than to allege at trial that either Miranda has been vio-
lated or that the attorney-client privilege has been infringed. 
To date, at least two jurisdictions have fashioned rules to prevent 
such conduct. New York has interpreted its state constitution to 
make waiver of the Mimnda rights impossible once counsel has 
been obtained unless waiver takes place in the presence of the at-
torney. 176 The Court of Military Appeals has construed the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice to require that when interrogators know 
that a suspect has counsel they must give that counsel notice of the 
planned interrogation and adequate opportunity to attend. 177 
However, overwhelmingly, the majority rule, both federaP 78 and 
state, 179 is that the police need not warn counsel of an impending 
interrogation of their clients. Further, most courts have held that a 
suspect who has previously invoked his right to counsel may later 
waive it in the absence of counsel. 180 A number of courts have, how-
ever, while sustaining the legality of questioning without notice to 
counsel, raised significant ethical questions about its 
propriety181-particularly when the questioning is done by a prose-
cutor.182 
Evans, supra, with United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1975). Spe-
cific factual findings do not appear to be required. However, the defense would be 
wise in many cases to attempt to obtain them. 
176 See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 448, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 
(1976); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325,329,239 N.E.2d 537,539,292 N.Y.S.2d 
663, 666 (1968). 
177 United States v. McOmber, 24 C.M.A. 297, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976). 
178 Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 
217, 223 (2d Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein). But see United State!> v. 
Flores-Calvillo, _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1976) (19 Crim. L. Rep. 2405, Sept. 14, 
1976) (defendant who had invoked her right to counsel could not waive that right 
later without the assistance of counsel). 
179 Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237, 238-39, 219 S.E.2d 158, 159-60 (1975); People v. 
Sandoval, 41 Ill. App. 3d 741, 353 N.E.2d 715 (1976); Goldstein v. State, 89 Nev. 
527, 516 P.2d 111 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 448 Pa. 206, 292 A.2d 302 
(1972); Lamb v. Commonwealth, _ Va. _, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976); State v. Gil-
crist, 12 Wash. App. 733, 531 P.2d 814 (1975). 
180 See generally section XI infra. 
181 Compare United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 923 (1973), citing Disciplinary Rule 7-104 of the ABA CODE OF PROFES· 
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY with State v. Gilcrist, 12 Wash. App. 733, 531 P.2d 814 
(1975). 
182 See the cases collected at United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
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XL THE EFFECTS OF INVOKING .l1IRANDA-
COMPLIANCE 
AND NONCOMPLIANCE 
A. INVOKING MIRANDA 
As has been previously discussed, 183 the Court in Miranda 
created a framework which prevents a statement from being ob-
tained during a custodial interrogation unless a valid waiver of 
rights has been obtained from the suspect. Although it is clear from 
Miranda that a nonwaiver is to be considered an affirmative exer-
cise of the Mimnda rights, the theoretical rule can be difficult to 
apply to the facts of an individual case, particularly when most 
courts recognize implied waivers. 
The clearest invocation of Miranda is a suspect's affirmative re-
fusal to speak, accompanied by a request for a lawyer. In such a 
case, the police are duty bound to cease interrogation184 and to ob-
tain counsel. 185 Either a refusal to speak or a request for counsel, 
unless qualified in some matter, will stop questioning. However, it 
is possible for a qualified exercise of rights to be made. A suspect 
may refuse to discuss a specific topic but remain willing to talk 
about other matters; the suspect may wish counsel but only at a 
later time; discussion at the moment may be rejected in favor of a 
later statement. Accordingly. each case must be looked at closely to 
determine to what extent the Miranda rights have actually been 
exercised. To the extent to which they have actually been invoked, 
the police must comply and/or cease interrogation. 
B. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 1l1IRANDA 
The price of noncompliance with Mi1·anda is simple-exclusion of 
the resulting evidence from trial. Subject to the effects of statutory 
attempts to overrule Miranda, 186 the case requires that the product 
of a Miranda violation and its derivative evidence be excluded from 
trial. 187 One significant exception to this exclusionary rule exists. 
183 Section IX supra. 
184 The extent to which interrogation may be resumed after the su:;pect has re-
fused to make a statement is unclear and is discussed in section XI, part C, i11/ra. 
185 However, the police may opt simply to discontinue the interrogation. This is 
not to suggest that the police may arbitrarily refuse to supply counsel, but if coun-
sel is in fact unavailable, the police may choose to notify coun!lel and discontinue 
questioning. See section VI, part A, supra. 
186 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). See ge11erally section XII infra. 
187 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966): "[N]o evidence obtained as a result of interrogation 
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The Supreme Court has expressly approved the use of evidence ob-
tained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes. 188 
This limited inroad on the exclusionary rule results from an in-
creasing Supreme Court dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule 
generally and Miranda specifically. By allowing such evidence to be 
used for impeachment, the Court has expressly countenanced police 
violation of Mimnda (and perhaps more importantly has encour-
aged it), for now the Court has given an interrogator who has been 
stymied by a suspect's refusal to talk, a reason to attempt to over-
come his assertion of his right to remain silent. 189 Perhaps for this 
reason, a number of jurisdictions have declined to follow the Su-
preme Court's lead and have expressly rejected the impeachment 
exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. 190 
C. MULTIPLE INTERROGATIONS 
Multiple interrogations present three significant problems: the 
degree to which proper warnings and waiver at one interrogation 
persist and extend to a later interrogation; the extent to which a 
defective warning or waiver at an interrogation may taint a sub-
sequent interrogation; and whether an individual who exercises his 
Miranda rights at one interrogation may be questoned again at a 
later time. Each question will be examined separately. 
The degree to which proper Miranda warnings and waiver may 
(in violation of Miranda) can be used." Despite some early state decisions to the 
contrary, Miranda appears to have intended to ban derivative evidence (the fruit 
of the poisonous tree) as well as evidence obtained in direct violation of Miranda. 
But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 460-61 (1974) (White, J. concurring). 
The ultimate effect of Miranda on derivative evidence is now unclear in view of 
the Supreme Court's increasingly hostile treatment of Miranda. See Comment, 
The Effects of Tucker on the "Fruits" of Il.legally Obtained Statements, 24 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 689 (1975), discussing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
188 Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
Note that while statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for im-
peachment, the statements must be voluntary in the non-Miranda sense. Kidd v. 
State,_ Md. _, _ A.2d _, 20 Crim. L. Rep. 2238 (Nov. 3, 1976); Booker v. 
State, 326 So. 2d 791, 793 (Miss. 1976); cf. United States v. Diop, __ F.2d __ (2d 
Cir. 1976) (filed 3 Dec. 1976). The Court may have opened the door for wider use 
of improperly obtained statements. See Greenfield v. State, _ So. 2d _, 20 
Crim. L. Rep. 2119 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976) (invocation of Miranda rights used to 
rebut insanity claim). 
189 Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 725 (1975) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
190 United States v. Girard, 23 C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R. 438 (1975); People v. Dis-
brow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368-69 (1976) 
(California Constitution construed); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 
657 (1971) (Hawaii Constitution construed); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pn. 
244, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (1975) (Pennsylvania Constitution construed). 
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persist and excuse the absence of warnings and waiver (or perhaps 
more importantly an incomplete or improper waiver) at a sub-
sequent interrogation is unclear and is usually addressed on a case-
by-case basis by the courts. If the time period between interroga-
tions is short and the multiple interrogations can be characterized 
as one continuous interrogation or a single transaction, the lack of 
warnings at the later interrogation will be harmless. 191 However, 
what defines a "continuous interrogation," or otherwise justifies 
waiving warnings at a second or later interrogation, depends solely 
upon the facts of each case and the approach of the individual cowt. 
Because a delay between waiver and interrogation or between suc-
cessive interrogations may easily taint a statement, 192 warnings 
should be given and a new waiver obtained at each interrogation to 
moot possible error and exclusion. 
The extent to which an improperly obtained statement may taint 
further interrogations despite an otherwise proper Mimnda waiver 
is a difficult question to determine in the absence of the specific 
facts of a given case. The law recognizes that any of the many fac-
tors 193 that could render a statement involuntary may well have 
continued effect-enough effect to render a later statement involun-
tary. The mere knowledge that a statement has already been given 
191 See United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1974) !the ultimate 
question is only: "Did the defendant with full knowledge of his legal rights, know-
ingly and intentionally relinquish them?"); United States v. Schultz, 19 C.~I.A. 
311, 41 C.M.R. 311 (1970) (7-hour delay did not affect "single continuous interro-
gation"); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974) (14 hours between 
waiver and final statement did taint statement); State\' . .Myers, 345 A.2d 500, 503 
(Me. 1975) (17-hour period between warnings and statement did not vitiate warn-
ings when defendant was reminded at the interrogation of the warnings previously 
given and he acknowledged them); State v. Reha, 86 N.l\L 291, 523 P.2d 26 ICt. 
App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974) (two sets of warnings were 
sufficient; third set was unnecessary in view of the short delay); State v. ~lcZorn. 
288 N.C. 417, 434-35, 219 S.E.2d 201, 212 (1975) 120-30 minute delav between 
interrogations did not affect prior warnings). • 
192 See United States v. Weston, 51 C.M.R. 868 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) 120-da\' delav 
and different offenses required new waiver); United States, •. Boster, 38 c.~I.R. 
681 (A.B.R. 1968) (two interrogation sessions found separate and distinct); State 
v. White, 288 N.C. 44, 52, 215 S.E.2d 557, 562 (1975) Ia number of hours' deJa\' 
between statement required a new warning and waiver when the second interr~­
gation took place at a new location and under different circumstances); Common-
wealth v. Wideman, 460 Pa. 699, _, 334 A.2d 594, 599 (1975) I 12-hour delav 
between initial waiver and confession required a nE'w set of warning<' when th~ 
interrogation was broken a number of times and thE' <'Usppct was allowed to sleep 
for a period). 
193 Incomplete warnings, erroneous warnings, failure to comply with an at-
tempted exercise of the right against self-incrimination or the right to counsel, 
physical coercion, threats, inducements and psychological coE'rcion, to name the 
more usual violations. 
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may be considered a major factor in a suspect's decision to make a 
subsequent statement. 194 
On the other hand, it is equally apparent that many of the errors 
that can cause a statement to be inadmissible may either be exceed-
ingly minor in scope and of little continued effect, or may be 
adequately counterbalanced by rights warnings and circumstances. 
The courts have generally treated these cases on a case-by-case 
basis, looking carefully at the unique facts of each to determine the 
probability that the impropriety of the first interrogation was over-
come by procedures used in the later one. 195 
The burden to show voluntariness remains with the prosecution, 
which must show the later statement to have been obtained in full 
compliance with Miranda and the voluntariness doctrine. The bur-
den may be difficult to meet under these conditions. The courts have 
apparently treated cases involving only Miranda violations at the 
earlier interrogation somewhat more leniently than cases involving 
violations of the pre-Miranda voluntariness doctrine. 196 In all such 
cases involving a later custodial interrogation, 197 proper warnings 
must be given and a proper waiver obtained. If this is done and the 
prosecution can show that any prior taint has been dissipated 198 by 
time, special warnings, or circumstances, the statement is apt to be 
admissible. 199 Statements involving physical coercion, threats or un-
194 The suspect may believe that the "cat is out of the bag" and he has nothing to 
Jose by confessing further. 
195 The courts have generally rejected the theory that the "cat is out of the bag" 
rationale requires suppression of ali subsequent statements unless perhaps the 
suspect is told that his prior statement is inadmissible. See Tanner v. Vincent, __ 
F.2d _, _, 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2509 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 1976) (and cases cited 
therein). However, the inadmissibility of the first statement is a factor that must 
be considered when weighing the admissibility of the later statement. See State v. 
Silver, 286 N.C. 709, 213 S.E.2d 247 (1975). 
196 See United States v. Toral, 536 F .2d 893 (9th Cir. 1976) (where first interroga-
tion had little that was inherently coercive and was defective almost exclusively 
because of the police failure to give warnings, the later statement was untainted). 
See generally C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (2d ed. 1972). 
197 While Miranda warnings only apply to custodial interrogation, it would seem 
only logical that an inadmissible statement could taint a subsequent statement 
obtained during noncustodial interrogation. However, the balancing test usually 
applied would likely make it easier for the prosecution to meet its burden in such a 
case. 
198 An exploitation of the first statement will likely render the second inadmissi-
ble. Similarly, a statement by the accused to the effect that "I wouldn't tell you 
this if I hadn't talked to you yesterday" will probably doom the statement if the 
prior statement had been inadmissible. 
199 See Tanner v. Vincent, _ F.2d _, 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2509 (2d Cir. 1976); 
People v. Linwood, 30 Ill. App. 3d 454, 333 N.E.2d 520 (1975); State v. Davis, __ 
La._, 336 So. 2d 805 (1976); State v. Dakota, 300 Minn. 12, 217 N.W.2d 748 
154 
HeinOnline  -- 78 Mil. L. Rev. 155 1977
1978] MIRANDA V . .4RIZON.4 
lawful inducement will be more difficult to salvage. 200 While not re-
quired, 201 interrogators attempting to repair an improperly ob-
tained statement should not only give the usual warnings but should 
notify the suspect that the earlier statement should be considered 
inadmissible at court, in order to moot later litigation. 202 
By far the most difficult question in this area is whether a sus-
pect's exercise of his Mimnda rights prevents questioning at a later 
time. Clearly, competing considerations are im·olved. Miranda ex-
pressly required that questioning must stop as soon as a suspect 
invokes his rights. 203 To allow repetitive attempts at interrogation 
can only be regarded as a wearing away of the Miranda armor, 
even if Miranda warnings are given during each attempt. 
On the other hand, a suspect may desire to change his mind and to 
make a statement-particularly if made aware of newly discovered 
evidence. If confession evidence is desirable, and society persists in 
viewing it as such, society has an interest in balancing the seem-
ingly absolute privilege against self-incrimination with a police right 
to ask a suspect to reconsider. The law is unsettled. 
In 1975, the Supreme Court in deciding Michigan t• •• ltosley 204 
attempted to resolve the problem but left the area in near hopeless 
confusion. Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection 
with a series of robberies. He was brought to the police department 
where he was advised of his rights, after which he affirmatively re-
(1974). But see Randall v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1974); United States u 
rei. Stephen J. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1970) !holding that under thl' 
circumstances the later statement was tainted). 
200 Violations of the traditional voluntariness doctrine are deemed more likely to 
have substantial long term effect than the failure to give the prophylactic 
Miranda warnings. Arguably this is correct (f one views the station housl.' or cus· 
todial interrogation atmosphere as less coercive than intentional affirmatin• mis· 
conduct. Similarly, threats, inducements, and so forth will usually be the results 
of intentional misconduct, while most .\fira11da violations may be unintentional. 
Under such circumstances the public policy behind the exclusionary rule should be 
applied differently, as the probability of deterring police misconduct will differ. 
For a different justification of different treatment, sec C. McCOIU!ICK, EVIDENCE 
345 (2d ed. 1972). 
201 See Tanner v. Vincent, ____ F.2d _____ , ___ , 19 Crim. L. Rep. 250~1 12d 
Cir. 1976); State v. Dakota, 300 1976); State v. Dakota, 300 ~linn. 12, 16, 217 
N.W. 2d 748, 751 (1974). 
2
-
02
- See-United States v. Seay, 24 C. M.A. 10, 51 C.M.R. 60 (1975) l"ln addition to 
rewarning the accused, the preferable course in seeking an additional statement 
would include advice that prior illegal admissions or other improperly obtained 
evidence which incriminated the accused cannot be used against him"). 
203 
" ••• if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not 
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him." 384 U.S. 436, 445 
(1966). See also 384 U.S. at 473-74. 
204 423 U.S. 96 (1975), hereinafter cited as .lloslt'y. 
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fused to answer any questions about the robberies. A few hours 
later, a different detective approached Mosley in his cell, gave 
proper warnings, and questioned him about a homicide. Mosely ad-
mitted participation. 
The majority of the Court held that Mosely's Miranda rights had 
not been violated in that the first interrogation had stopped im-
mediately when he refused to answer questions, and the second ses-
sion pertained to an entirely different offense. 205 The majority ap-
pears to have highlighted the fact that while Mosley exercised his 
privilege against self-incrimination, he did not request counsel. 206 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, 207 dissenting, pointed out that the 
homicide was in fact connected with the robberies, as Mosley had 
been arrested only after a "tip" that concerned both offenses, and 
that not only had the interrogations been connected, but that Mos-
ley's refusal to discuss the robberies should have been construed to 
have included the homicide. More importantly, the dissenters 
criticized, properly it would seem, the majority's holding 208 that so 
long as a refusal to talk was "scrupulously honored" interrogation 
could resume at some later time. Not only did such a test seem to 
further erode Miranda, 209 but it created a test without meaning, 
for no indication of time limit between interrogations appears in the 
opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall suggested that subsequent 
interrogation should be prohibited until counsel was appointed and 
present or until the accused was arraigned. 210 
Thus, at present the police may attempt to question a suspect 
who has previously asserted his right against self-incrimination so 
long as they honored the original refusal to talk and so long as some 
unknown time period existed between the two interrogations. Fur-
ther, the Court has arguably ruled only on a subsequent interroga-
tion for an offense unrelated to the first interrogation, although the 
Court's ultimate direction appears clear. It is, however, important 
to note that the majority in Mosley highlighted the fact that Mosley 
had not affirmatively requested counsel, suggesting strongly to the 
205 It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated: " ... I 
suspect that in the final analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the 
standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to silence by a properly in-
formed defendant. I think the Court should say so now." 423 U.S. at 168. 
2os 423 U.S. at 104. 
207 423 U.S. at 111. 
208 ld. at 114-15. For further discussion see Note, 21 VILL. L. REV. 761 (1976-
76). 
2 0 9 Compare Mosley with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. 
210 423 U.S. at 116. 
156 
HeinOnline  -- 78 Mil. L. Rev. 157 1977
1978] IJIIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
reader that a request for counsel might block subsequent interroga-
tion until counsel was obtained. 211 Such a rule would find some pre-
cedent in the decisions of a number of lower courts. 212 
At present the state of the law may be summarized thusly: It is 
clearly constitutional to request a statement, after proper warnings 
and waiver, of a suspect who has previously refused to make a 
statement about a different offense, if there has been an "appreci-
able" delay between interrogations and if the circumstances do not 
seem coercive. It is pmbably proper to attempt a later interroga-
tion involving the same offense that the suspect originally refused 
to discuss so long as his original refusal to talk was "scrupulously 
honored." 213 It is also clear that the Court has rejected the notion 
that Miranda expressly forbids renewal of interrogation. 214 All 
other questions, particularly those cases in which the suspect did in 
fact request counsel, 215 are left open for later decision. 
211 ld. at 104, note 10: [Miranda] "directed that 'the interrogation must cease 
until an attorney is present 'only' [i]f the individual states that he wants an attor· 
ney.'" However, the Supreme Court in Brewer \'. Williams, __ U.S. __ , 45 
U.S.L.W. 4287, 4292 (1977) appears to accept the proposition that a defendant 
may always waive his right to counsel although it is "incumbent upon the State to 
prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege.' " [citations omitted]. Thus, it seems that a defendant may be ques-
tioned a second time even though at the first session he requested counsel. For 
the second session to yield an admissible statement, however, in the absence of 
counsel, the accused must intentionally and knowingly give up the right to 
counsel-arguably from Breu•er's context a higher standard than normally used in 
Miranda cases. 
212 See United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975). 
213 See State v. Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24, __ , 545 P.2d 986, 991 !1976); People v. 
Almond, 67 Mich. App. 713, 717-18, 242 N. W .2d 498, 501 !1976); Commonwealth 
v. Reiland, _ Pa. Super. Ct. _, 359 A.2d 811 (1976); State \'. Robbins, 15 
Wash. App. 108, 547 P.2d 288 (1976). There are numerous similar cases predating 
Mosley. See United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. 
O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 71,216 N.W.2d 822,829 (1974). Note United States\'. Olof, 
527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to cut off questioning was not "scrupulously 
honored" and later statement was held inadmissible); Harne v. State, 534 S. W.2d 
703 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1976). 
2 14 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1975). 
215 While some courts have held that a request for counsel prevents later interro-
gation until counsel has been obtained and present, see United States v. Flores-
Cavillo, _ F.2d_, 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2405 (9th Cir. July 14, 1976); People v. 
Parnell, 31 Ill. App. 3d 627, 630, 334 N.E.2d 403, 406 (1975), numerous courts 
have found a request for counsel to be of no particular significance in deterring a 
later interrogation. See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); 
People v. Morgan, 39 III. App. 3d 588, 350 N.E.2d 27 (1976); Commonwealth v. 
Orton,_ Mass App. Ct._, 355 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1976): Buckingham v. State, 
_Tenn. App. _, 540 S. W.2d 660 (Ct. Crim. App.), cert denied, _ Tenn. __ , 
_ S. W.2d _ (1976).See also Brown v. United States, 359 A.2d 600 <D.C. Ct. 
App. 1976) (interrogating detective was unaware of suspect's prior request for 
counsel, statement was admissible). See also n.210 supra, discussing Brewer v. 
Williams,_ U.S._ (1977). 
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XII. OVERRULING MIRANDA BY STATUTE 
Believing that Miranda was a major impediment to effective law 
enforcement, police, prosecutors, and much of the nation's more 
vocal citizenry greeted the decision with outrage that has cooled 
only slightly with time. The national displeasure resulted in a Con-
gressional attempt to overrule Miranda by statute which President 
Johnson signed into law as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968.216 Insofar as Miranda was concerned, the 
statute attempted to replace the Miranda exclusionary rule that 
required suppression of a statement obtained without proper 
Miranda warnings and waiver, with a pre-Miranda voluntariness 
test. 217 
At the time of its enactment, the "Post-Miranda Act" was consid-
ered unlikely to affect Miranda directly, as Miranda was consid-
ered a decision resulting from constitutional interpretation and be-
yond statutory control. 218 Accordingly, while other sections of the 
216 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. The relevant portion of the Act usually 
termed either the "Post-Miranda Act" or the "Anti-Miranda Act" is 18 U.S.C. § 
3501 (1970). See generally 0. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CON-
FESSIONS OF GUILT 139-45, 163-64 (1973); and Gandara, Admissibility of Confes-
sions in Federal Prosecutions: Implementation of Section 3501 by Law Enforce-
ment Officials and the Courts, 63 GEo. L.J. 305 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Gan-
dara). For the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 see [1968] U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& AD. NEWS 2124-2150. 
217 18 u.s.c § 3501(b) (1970): 
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take Into consideration all 
the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, Including (I) the time elapsing 
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if It was made after 
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with 
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) 
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any 
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such 
defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel, and 
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance or counsel when questioned and 
when giving such confession. 
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken Into consideration 
by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness or the confession. 
218 Despite some argument that Congress should have acted to limit the federal 
courts' jurisdiction to review on appeal, a finding that a confession was voluntary 
in the § 3501 sense, see [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2139-2160, Con-
gress seems to have abandoned its attempt to expressly limit federal jurisdiction, 
and there seems to have been significant doubt that the statute could actually 
affect Miranda. See Gandara, supra note 216, at 311-13; 0. STEPHENS, supra 
note 216, at 142-45. Professor Stephens suggests at page 146 that the statutory 
effort to limit Miranda may have been intended to signal the Supreme Court that 
it had gone too far and should reconsider Miranda and its general approach in 
criminal matters. 
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statute had effect, 219 the Miranda portion tended to be ignored. 220 
However, the Supreme Court's clear dislike for Miranda has re-
sulted in a significant shift in the potential importance of the 
statute. 
In Michigan v. Tucke1·, 221 the Supreme Court apparently found 
that Mi1·anda lacked constitutional dimension and served only as 
"prophylactic rules." 222 While there is surely every reason to be-
lieve that the Warren Court had not intended to set the Mimnda 
decision in concrete for all time, 223 Mimnda was clearly a decision 
of constitutional dimension. With the Court's present view, how-
ever, it seems possible that the "Post-Miranda Act" could be found 
by the Court to have pre-empted the Court's "nonconstitutionally 
required" Miranda framework. 
Although the Supreme Court had not had the occasion to construe 
the legality and effect of the "Post-Miranda Act" by the early part 
of 1977, some courts had begun to apply it to prevent exclusion of 
statements that would have been suppressed under .lfim nda. 224 
While at present Miranda governs, the long term effect of the 
statutory attempt to overrule it is unknown and cannot be dismissed 
as clearly ineffective. 
XIII. MIRANDA'S FUTURE 
Miranda has been with us since 1966. Although it seems unlikely 
that it will ever pass from the legal scene completely. it would take 
an incurable optimist to predict its continued vitality in even its 
present form by 1980. The Supreme Court has consistently 225 
219 The sections attempting to overrule the Courts' decisions in McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 11957), 
were apparently successful. 
220 See Gandara, supra note 216, at 311-13, indicating that federal law enforce-
ment agents have adhered to Miranda and that many of the United States Attor-
neys did not urge § 3501 on Federal District Courts to save confessions, although 
the Southern District of New York "had invoked section 3501 in several cases 
... " Gandara at 312. 
2 2 1 417 u.s. 433 (1974). 
222 I d. at 466. 
223 Miranda expressly recognized that other effective techniques might be de-
veloped which could replace the warnings. 384 U.S. 436, 467 U966). 
224 See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1136-1138 UOth Cir. 1975) which 
states, 
We have held that \"oluntariness is the sole constituuonnl rt>qul•lt" t:<•'·.,mtn~; the ndml<:slon of 
a confession in e\·idence .... We belie\"e th•t Michi1:3n ,._ Turkl'r • nlthou~;b Mt tnw•h·tn~; 
the provisions of § 3501, supra. did. in effl.'ct, adopt and uphold th~ con•utuuon3hty of ttc 
provisions thereof. 
510 F.2d at 1137 (citations omitted). 
225 But see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); and United States v. Hale, 422 
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undercut its stepchild 226 and has clearly made preparations for its 
eventual demise. Congress has attempted to overrule it, 227 and 
many of the subordinate federal and state courts have made a point 
of distinguishing between statements inadmissible under the volun-
tariness doctrine and statements obtained "only" in violation of 
Miranda. 228 The outpouring of sentiment that accompanies every 
case taken by the Supreme Court that might be used as a vehicle to 
further hasten Miranda's end indicates that much of the nation con-
tinues to reject the case. 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the continued resistance 
to Miranda is that there seems little empirical evidence to substan-
tiate the many claims made on behalf of its opponents. While clearly 
Miranda has educated police to a functional knowledge of the fifth 
amendment privilege 229 and has made a change in interrogation 
U.S. 171 (1975), holding that the silence of a suspect after having received 
Miranda warnings may not be admitted at trial for impeachment purposes. Argu· 
ably these cases involve the basic exercise of the self-incrimination privilege 
rather than Miranda itself. To penalize for silence after having warned a suspect 
of his right to remain silent, would appear destructive of the privilege. 
226 Oregon v. Mathiason,_ U.S._, 45 U.S.L.W. 3500 (1977); Oregon v. Hass, 
420 U.S. 714 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971). It is interesting to note that Professor Yale Kamisar ob-
served in 1973 that "not only has the Burger Court failed to counter the strong 
resistance of law enforcement officials and the lower courts to the Warren Court's 
landmark criminal procedure decisions, such as Miranda ... but has actively en· 
couraged such resistance." Address by Yale Kamisar, the Second Kenneth J. Hod· 
son Lecture in Criminal Law, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 
Charlottesville, VA (January 25, 1973). In view of the Court's decision in Stone v. 
Powell, _ U.S._ (1976), limiting federal review via habeas corpus of state 
fourth amendment violations, it seems likely that it will soon limit review of 
Miranda violations. Although the Court failed to take the opportunity to substan-
tially modify Miranda in Brewer v. Williams,_ U.S. _, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287 
(1977), Brewer makes it clear that at least five members of the Court are unhappy 
with Miranda and would modify it given the proper case. 
227 See section XII, supra. 
228 A number of appellate courts have distinguished between "voluntariness" vio-
lations and Miranda violations in applying the Chapman harmless error rule 
rather than the "automatic reversal rule" to Miranda violations. See Smith v. 
Estelle, 519 F .2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishes between "coerced" and "un-
lawful" confessions); Null v. Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1975) (and 
cases cited therein); State v. Magby,_ Ariz._, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976); People v. 
Anthony, 38 Ill. App. 3d 427, 347 N.E.2d 770 (1976); State v. Ayers, 16 Oro. App. 
300, 518 P.2d 190 (1974); State v. Persuitti, 133 Vt. 354, 339 A.2d 750 (1975); 
Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1975). See also Note, Criminal 
Law: Applying the Harmless Error Rule to a Confession Obtained in Violation of 
Miranda-the Oklahoma View, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 374 (1975); Note, Harmless 
Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967) (suggests that Miranda viola-
tions could not be harmless). 
229 If, ... (Miranda's) impact is seen largely in terms of the educational purposes served by many 
Supreme Court rulings, Miranda can be accorded great importance. Regardless of his estimate 
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procedures, the studies of Mimnda's actual effects on law enforce-
ment suggest that those effects have been minimal. 230 
Miranda's effects should be analyzed from two perspectives-the 
degree to which it has hindered law enforcement by preventing con-
fessions or related benefits, 231 and the degree to which it has truly 
proven to be a protection against the "inherent coercion of the sta-
tion house." In both cases Miranda's actual effects appear to have 
been minimal. While it has not hurt law enforcement seriously, 
neither has it particularly improved the lot of the suspect. 232 
Should this be the case, why has Mimnda encountered so much 
resistance? While the evidence suggests minimal actual effect, there 
can be no question that Mimnda is pe;·ceii,ed as having reduced the 
number of statements made and consequently the overall conviction 
and case clearance rate. Thus, the popular belief does not corre-
spond with the reality. Further, a number of the studies have incli-
cated that while police may know the rules, they are frequently un-
aware of Mimnda's policy intent and its background. Thus, Jack of 
education is a significant factor in the opposition to the case. 233 This 
of the decision, eaoh officer whom we lnten·iewed d~Fplay«.>d at lea.t rudimentary knm> I...J~e vf 
the Fifth Amendment requirements outlined in .lftrando Surh kno\\ledgr, lrrt"5F-<'~ll\e c.f 
competing policy considerations, could be an indispeMable pr..requiflte to th~ reoo~.tllon ~r 
fundamental rights and the constitutional performance of prore..,ional dutl«.>o In ths. ""'" 
0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUU .. T 200 ( 1!173). 
230 I d., 179-200; Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the .old ministration of 
Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda 011 Police E.f.fec:luality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973); Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The lm· 
plementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1 (1970); Nedalie, Zeitz & All:'xander, 
Custodial Police Interrogation· in Our Nation's Capital.· The Attempt !o lmple· 
ment Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, .\liranda in 
Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1967); Griffith & Ayrt>s, 
A Postscript to the Miranda Project: lnterrogati01z of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE 
L.J. 300 (1967); Comment, Interrogation in Nell' Hat•en: The Impact of .\liranda, 
76 YALE L.J. 1641 (1967). 
231 One commentator found that police in ont> city felt that .Uiranda had ad\'t>rst> 
effects "in five areas: (1) in the outcome of formal intt>rrogations. (2) in the collat-
eral functions of interrogation [i.e., implication of accomplices. t<olving other 
crimes, recovery of stolen property, and clt>aring suspt>cts], (3) in the amount of 
stolen property recovered, (4) in their conviction ratt>, and (5) in tht>ir clt>arnnce 
rate." Witt, n.230, supra at 322. 
232 See Griffith, n.230 supra. The problem with Miranda as a rt>medy for 
psychological coercion is that the warnings, evt>n if propt>rly given, do not appt>ar 
to act to diminish the underlying compulsion to coopt>rate and are, therefor~?, val· 
ueless. Equally important is the perception of many familiar with police work that 
the warnings are given in such a rapid and/or ritualistic fashion, or with Ut<t' of 
voice intonations that either threaten or t>mbarrass the suspect, that they art> t>f· 
fectively nullified. 
233 On the Thursday following the Supreme Court's dt>cision in Ort>gon v. 
Mathiason, n.226 supra, the editorial page of the Washington Post carried a stri· 
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is particularly important, for Miranda has become a symbol-an 
overly simplistic symbol-in the minds of many who view it as a 
token of "liberal" support for the rights of criminals in preference to 
support for the forces of law and order needed for the continued 
survival of society. 
Perhaps in reaction, many of those who support the case view it 
as one of the truly basic guarantees of freedom in contemporary 
civilization, neglecting to note the probability that it has failed to 
accomplish its primary purpose. Viewed as a symbol-a symbol that 
has never been truly comprehended by most of the country-
Miranda's problems may be explained, for Miranda is a handy tool 
for police and public who feel abandoned by the judicial process, and 
who look for simplistic explanations for the crime problem. After 
all, it is easier to blame the courts for coddling criminals, using 
Miranda as an example of such anti-social interference, than to 
come to grips with the incredibily complicated causation underlying 
the ongoing crime rate. Regardless of the reality, however, and re-
gardless of the reasons, there can be little doubt that Miranda lacks 
the minimum consensus needed for the continued effective survival 
of a Supreme Court decision. 
What then of Miranda? It seems highly likely that a procedural 
mechanism similar to 18 U.S.C. § 3501 234 or to the American Law 
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 235 will be 
dent editorial criticizing the Court's decision as having further narrowed Miranda 
by having limited it to custodial interrogations. Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1977 at 
-· If a major newspaper's editorial writers can be so ignorant of the minimum 
holding of Miranda, one can only speculate as to the ignorance of layman and 
policeman alike. 
234 See section XII supra. 
235 The Model Code, published in 1975, adopts a quasi-Miranda framework for 
questioning suspects prior to appearance at the police station, stating that "the 
officer shall warn such person as promptly as is reasonable under the circum-
stances, and in any case before engaging in any sustained questioning" (of his 
right to remain silent, and that if he wants a lawyer he will not be questioned until 
one is later made available), § 120.2(5)(a), emphasis added, and also prior to inter-
rogation after arrival at the station, § 140.8. The Code also includes limitations on 
the period of questioning (normally a limit of five hours questioning at the police 
station), §§ 140.8(4) and 130.2; and specifies additional rights such as the right to 
communicate with "counsel, relatives or friends" by telephone, §§ 110.2(5)(a) (iii); 
130.1(5); and 140.8(1). Further, aspects of the voluntariness doctrine are set forth 
as codal sections: §§ 140.2 (deception may not be used to induce a statement by 
indicating that a suspect is legally required to make one); 140.3 (abuse, threats, or 
denial of necessities may not be used to induce a statement); 140.4 (questioning of 
great length, frequency or persistence may not be used to induce a statement; 
neither may "any other method which, in light of such person's age, intelligence 
and mental and physical condition, unfairly undermines his ability to make 11 
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adopted. Under such a mechanism, rights warnings would continue 
to be required in one form or another, and requested counsel would 
still have to be supplied, but the result of a good faith mistake or 
omission would not necessarily be fatal to the resulting evidence's 
admissibility. In short, the "new" test to be applied for suppression 
will likely be a variant of the "old" voluntariness test. Should this be 
the case, Miranda will never be overruled; it will simply be 
emasculated. 
choice whether to make a statement or otherwise cooperate."). Where the .!!lode I 
Code differs radically from Miranda is in the result of a violation of itt-: require· 
ments. Unlike the near total ,,!i1·anda exclusion, the .!!lode! Code requires ::<uppret<-
sion only if the violation was either in violation of the Constitution or "t-:ubt-:tan-
tial." § 150.3(1). "Substantial" violations include those which were "gro;;;;, wilful 
and prejudicial to the accused," § 150.3(2)(a), those "of a kind likely to lead ac-
cused persons to misunderstand their position or legal rights and to have influ-
enced the accused's decision to make the statement," § 150.3(2)1bl, and tho::<e in 
which "the violation created a significant risk that an incriminating statement may 
have been untrue," § 150.3(2)(c). Section 150.3(3) sets forth criteria to be used in 
determining whether a violation not covered by § 150.3(:!), supra, is "subt-:tan-
tial." The Model Code expressly provides that notwitht-:tanding a violation of its 
requirements, consultation with counsel between the time of violation and thE' 
time of making the statement makes the violation "non:;ubstantial." If the primary 
evidence is to be excluded under the Code, so too will bE- derivative evidencE' un-
less inevitable discovery can be shown and exclusion is not nE-cE-s;;ary to protect 
compliance with the Code, § 150.4. For a brief summary of thl' :.lode! Codl.' tiff' 
Vorenberg, A.L.l. Approves Model Code of Prt'·Arraigumeut ProC'edure, IH 
A.B.A.J. 1212 (1975). 
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